The Persistence of Diminished Democracy in a Second Trump Presidency

The Persistence of Diminished Democracy in a Second Trump Presidency

Bright Line Watch December 2025–January 2026 and February–March 2026 surveys

Bright Line Watch fielded two recent surveys of political science faculty at American colleges and uni­ver­si­ties (whom we refer to as “experts” below) and rep­re­sen­ta­tive samples of Americans (whom we refer to as “the public” below). 

The first survey, which was fielded in late December 2025 and early January 2026, over­lapped with the January 3 military strike in Venezuela and the January 6 deploy­ment of up to 2,000 addi­tion­al Department of Homeland Security personnel to Operation Metro Surge in Minnesota. Both seemed poten­tial­ly con­se­quen­tial for per­cep­tions of U.S. demo­c­ra­t­ic per­for­mance. We therefore chose to conduct a second survey in February–March 2026 and report the results of both surveys here rather than release poten­tial­ly outdated results from the previous survey.

The first survey was fielded from December 22, 2025–January 7, 2026 among experts (564 responses) and from December 22, 2025–January 6, 2026 among the public (2,750 responses). The second was fielded from February 19–March 10, 2026 among experts (621 responses) and from February 24–March 6, 2026 among the public (2,750 responses). 

We collected expert survey data in part­ner­ship with Luth Research, which managed survey invi­ta­tions to preserve par­tic­i­pant anonymity. Panel man­age­ment and data col­lec­tion for the public surveys were conducted by YouGov. All public survey results reported below incor­po­rate the post-strat­i­fi­ca­tion weights provided by YouGov.

Executive summary

  • Expert ratings of U.S. democracy have largely sta­bi­lized at lower levels than any prior period since our data begin in 2017. During Donald Trump’s first term and Joe Biden’s pres­i­den­cy, ratings among experts never fell below 60 or exceeded 70 on a 0–100 scale. However, they fell sharply in the first months of Trump’s second pres­i­den­cy, reaching a new low of 53 in April 2025. They remained sta­tis­ti­cal­ly unchanged at 54 in September 2025 before increas­ing to 60 in the initial expert ratings collected in our December 2025–January 2026 survey. This rating, which exceeded previous forecasts, may have reflected the effective con­tes­ta­tion of off-year elections in November 2025. 

  • However, data collected during the December 2025–January 2026 survey show that expert ratings of U.S. democracy declined after the capture of Nicolás Maduro, reverting toward prior levels (56). Those assess­ments remained con­sis­tent in our February–March 2026 survey (57). Expert forecasts for 2027 are stable at 56 before an expected rise to 60 in 2032.

  • The sharp and per­sis­tent decline in expert ratings of U.S. democracy that we have observed cor­re­sponds with the declines reported for 2025 in annual ratings released last week by The V‑Dem Institute and Freedom House. However, our more frequent expert surveys show that this decline was con­cen­trat­ed in the early months of last year and that ratings of demo­c­ra­t­ic per­for­mance have largely sta­bi­lized in the period since.

  • Ratings of democracy among the public also declined to a new low during Trump’s second pres­i­den­cy and sta­bi­lized there with only modest improve­ments. However, these average ratings mask a deepening partisan divide on demo­c­ra­t­ic per­for­mance, which has now reached record levels, exceeding the gaps observed during Trump’s first term and Biden’s pres­i­den­cy. The increased gap in the February–March 2026 survey is driven by Republicans, whose eval­u­a­tions of U.S. democracy have reached their highest levels since our first public survey during Trump’s first year in office in 2017.

  • When provided with a descrip­tion of three hypo­thet­i­cal gov­ern­ments and asked to rate them on the same 0–100 scale as the U.S., experts, Democrats, and Republicans all rate a hypo­thet­i­cal strong democracy above a hypo­thet­i­cal illiberal democracy and put a non-democracy lowest. However, experts and Democrats rate the U.S. closer to the hypo­thet­i­cal illiberal democracy than the hypo­thet­i­cal strong democracy. Republicans, by contrast, place the U.S. closer to the hypo­thet­i­cal strong democracy because they rate current U.S. democracy higher and the hypo­thet­i­cal strong democracy lower, on average, than do the other groups.

  • Expert ratings of U.S. per­for­mance on 35 demo­c­ra­t­ic prin­ci­ples were largely unchanged since September 2025, though experts did see improve­ments in judicial checks on the executive and not using the military for political purposes, which may reflect the recent Supreme Court tariff decision and the end of domestic deploy­ments of the National Guard.

  • We observe several troubling shifts in how important the public considers these prin­ci­ples to be — Democrats are less likely to say pre­vent­ing political violence is important, while Republicans show sig­nif­i­cant declines in endorsing the pro­tec­tion of free speech, con­sti­tu­tion­al and judicial limits on the executive, and respon­sive­ness to public opinion.

  • Experts iden­ti­fied a large number of recent events as threats to democracy. The consensus on the threat was near-unanimous for several events related to the rule of law (96% for Trump directing Attorney General Pam Bondi to prosecute his political enemies); elections (93% for Trump’s call to “nation­al­ize” voting), and speech (93% for Trump’s claim that Democratic lawmakers committed sedition by saying the military should refuse unlawful orders). 

  • Among the public, approval of these events was wide­spread among Republicans, par­tic­u­lar­ly those who identify as sup­port­ers of President Trump rather than the Republican Party.

  • Despite Trump and his allies again raising unfounded questions about election integrity, public con­fi­dence in the voting system is com­pa­ra­ble to before the 2020 election and less polarized than it was before the 2022 and 2024 elections. 

Overall eval­u­a­tions of American democracy

Since 2017, Bright Line Watch has asked experts and the public to rate U.S. democracy on a 0–100 scale. We report these measures in the figure below along with expected ratings of future per­for­mance in 2027 and 2032.


Across 23 previous surveys admin­is­tered during Trump’s first term and Biden’s pres­i­den­cy, ratings among experts were rel­a­tive­ly stable, never falling below 60 or exceeding 70. The first months of Trump’s second pres­i­den­cy brought a pre­cip­i­tous drop to 53 by April 2025. Ratings sta­bi­lized there, remaining sta­tis­ti­cal­ly unchanged at 54 in September 2025. 

By the time of our next data col­lec­tion, however, experts rated American democracy more favorably — perhaps because of the defeats Republicans faced at the polls in off-year elections in 2025, which showed that the playing field had not been tilted against the oppo­si­tion and that free and fair elections were still possible. Experts who were surveyed in late December 2025 and early January 2026 before the U.S. raid in Venezuela (discussed further below) rated U.S. democracy at 60, its highest point since Trump’s return to the pres­i­den­cy. These ratings are sub­stan­tial­ly higher than expected for the end of 2025 according to both human fore­cast­ers on the pre­dic­tion platform Metaculus (50) and the AI fore­cast­er Mantic (52).


However, expert ratings of democracy reverted nearly to September 2025 levels (56) after Operation Absolute Resolve, a military operation conducted on January 3, 2026 without con­gres­sion­al approval in which Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro was captured and removed to the U.S. One possible inter­pre­ta­tion of this shift is that the Maduro raid rein­forced concerns about the lack of con­straints on Trump’s use of executive power, though, as discussed below, experts rated the raid as a less serious threat to democracy than many other recent events.

Most recently, ratings of U.S. democracy among experts remained at approx­i­mate­ly the same level in our February–March 2026 survey (57) as imme­di­ate­ly after the Maduro raid (56). These ratings continue to place U.S. democracy between recent expert ratings of Israel (49) and Mexico (60) and far from countries pre­vi­ous­ly con­sid­ered to be peer democ­ra­cies such as Great Britain (83) and Canada (88). 

The sharp and per­sis­tent decline in expert ratings of U.S. democracy that we have observed during Trump’s second pres­i­den­cy cor­re­sponds with the declines reported for 2025 in annual ratings released last week by The V‑Dem Institute and Freedom House. As described above, however, our more frequent expert surveys show that this decline was con­cen­trat­ed in the early months of last year and that ratings of demo­c­ra­t­ic per­for­mance have largely sta­bi­lized in the period since. We also note that expert forecasts of ratings for U.S. democracy are stable for 2027 at 56 and more opti­mistic in the longer term, rising to 60 for 2032. 

Ratings of U.S. democracy among the public tend to be lower than among experts, but they have followed a similar trend over time. As with the experts, their rating on our 0–100 scale remained within a rel­a­tive­ly narrow range during Trump’s first term and Biden’s pres­i­den­cy (52–58) before dropping to a low of 49 by April 2025. Public ratings have trended slightly higher since, reaching 52 in February–March 2026. 

However, the recent stability we observe in public ratings of U.S. democracy masks a deepening partisan divide on demo­c­ra­t­ic per­for­mance. Since 2017, sup­port­ers of both parties have rated democracy more favorably when their party controls the White House, but the partisan gap in mean democracy ratings by party ranged from 0–12 points during the first Trump pres­i­den­cy and Biden’s term in office. During the second Trump pres­i­den­cy, the divide has widened, reaching 18 points in the February–March 2026 survey, the largest gap we have measured. 


Notably, eval­u­a­tions increased from December 2025–January 2026 to February–March 2026 among both Democrats and Republicans, but the increase among Republicans was larger (59 to 64 versus 42 to 45 among Democrats), pushing GOP sup­port­ers to the most favorable eval­u­a­tions recorded since our first public survey in October 2017.

The public’s expec­ta­tions for the future of U.S. democracy show some mild optimism, with forecast values rising to 54 for 2027 and 56 for 2032. Notably, both Republicans and Democrats expect improve­ments in demo­c­ra­t­ic per­for­mance in 2027 (from 64 to 66 and 45 to 48, respec­tive­ly). Republican expec­ta­tions are similar for 2032 (to 63) whereas Democrats foresee further improve­ment (to 57).

Institutional dif­fer­ences across regime types

In September 2025, we asked experts to use the same 0–100 scale described above to evaluate the state of democracy in three hypo­thet­i­cal countries described in the dropdown table below — a pro­to­typ­i­cal strong democracy, an illiberal democracy in which inde­pen­dent checks on power are partially com­pro­mised, and a non-democracy. 

Regime types
Country A [strong democracy]Country B [illiberal democracy]Country C [non-democracy]
ElectionsElections are regular and com­pet­i­tive; oppo­si­tion campaigns have equal access to venues and media; incumbent use of state resources for campaigns is pro­hib­it­ed and enforced. Elections are regular but not fully com­pet­i­tive; oppo­si­tion campaigns face dis­ad­van­tages in access to venues and media; incumbent use of state resources for campaigns is pro­hib­it­ed but weakly enforced. Elections are regular but not com­pet­i­tive; oppo­si­tion campaigns face severe restric­tions on access to venues and media; incumbent use of state resources for campaigns is pervasive and unconstrained. 
CourtsJudges are appointed through plu­ral­is­tic, merit-based pro­ce­dures; the judiciary is inde­pen­dent; courts regularly review and annul executive acts. Judges are appointed through mixed pro­ce­dures with executive influence; the judiciary is partly inde­pen­dent; courts infre­quent­ly review or annul executive acts.Judges are appointed from ruling-party lists; the judiciary is not inde­pen­dent; courts do not review or annul executive acts. 
Law enforce­mentProsecutors are legally inde­pen­dent; charging decisions are insulated from political direction; high-profile cases against oppo­si­tion figures are not announced near elections. Prosecutors are sub­or­di­nate to the executive; charging decisions are exposed to political influence; high-profile cases against oppo­si­tion figures are rarely announced near elections. Prosecutors are directed by the prime minister’s office; charging decisions follow political direc­tives; high-profile cases against oppo­si­tion figures are fre­quent­ly announced near elections.
MediaMedia reg­u­la­tion protects editorial inde­pen­dence; national broad­cast­ers follow inde­pen­dence codes; accred­i­ta­tion and access rules are viewpoint-neutral. Media reg­u­la­tion nominally protects editorial inde­pen­dence; national broad­cast­ers face admin­is­tra­tive pressure; accred­i­ta­tion and access rules are selec­tive­ly applied.Media reg­u­la­tion permits executive control; national broad­cast­ers face severe pressure to conform; accred­i­ta­tion and access rules exclude critical outlets. 
Government dataOfficial sta­tis­tics and the national audit insti­tu­tion are legally inde­pen­dent; release calendars and methods are set without political input and reports are published without pre-clearance. Official sta­tis­tics and the national audit insti­tu­tion are sub­or­di­nate to line min­istries; release calendars and methods are shaped by input from political leaders; reports are sometimes reviewed before publication. Official sta­tis­tics and the national audit insti­tu­tion are con­trolled by the executive branch; release calendars and methods are directed by political leaders; reports are fre­quent­ly delayed, altered, or withheld. 
Civil serviceSenior civil service appoint­ments are made by open, merit-based com­pe­ti­tion; political appoint­ments are limited by law; vacancies are publicly advertised.Senior civil service appoint­ments are governed by merit rules with wide dis­cre­tion for political appoint­ments; political criteria affect career pro­gres­sion; vacancies are unevenly advertised. Senior civil service appoint­ments are made at the government’s dis­cre­tion without com­pet­i­tive merit pro­ce­dures; political appoint­ments are standard; vacancies are not publicly advertised.

In our December 2025–January 2026 survey, we asked the public to rate these same hypo­thet­i­cal countries in addition to the experts. The results for both groups are reported below.


Each group rated the hypo­thet­i­cal strong democracy highest on the 0–100 scale, followed by the U.S., the hypo­thet­i­cal illiberal democracy, and the hypo­thet­i­cal non-democracy. However, the relative gaps between U.S. democracy and the other regime types vary by group. Among experts, the average rating of the U.S. (57) is closer to that of the hypo­thet­i­cal illiberal democracy (47) than to the hypo­thet­i­cal strong democracy (93). The same pattern holds for the public overall (52, 39, and 73, respec­tive­ly) and for Democrats (45, 38, and 79, respec­tive­ly). By contrast, Republicans place the United States closer to the hypo­thet­i­cal strong democracy than do other groups, both because they rate current U.S. democracy higher (64), and the hypo­thet­i­cal strong democracy lower, on average, than the other groups do (68). 

Assessing per­for­mance on specific demo­c­ra­t­ic principles

We asked experts and the public to evaluate U.S. per­for­mance on 35 demo­c­ra­t­ic prin­ci­ples listed in the dropdown below.

35 demo­c­ra­t­ic principles
  • Government officials are legally sanc­tioned for misconduct
  • Government officials do not use public office for private gain
  • Government agencies are not used to monitor, attack, or punish political opponents
  • All adult citizens enjoy the same legal and political rights
  • Government does not interfere with jour­nal­ists or news organizations
  • Government effec­tive­ly prevents private actors from engaging in polit­i­cal­ly-motivated violence or intimidation
  • Government protects indi­vid­u­als’ right to engage in unpopular speech or expression
  • Political com­pe­ti­tion occurs without criticism of opponents’ loyalty or patriotism
  • Elections are free from foreign influence
  • Parties and can­di­dates are not barred due to their political beliefs and ideologies
  • All adult citizens have equal oppor­tu­ni­ty to vote
  • All votes have equal impact on election outcomes
  • Elections are conducted, ballots counted, and winners deter­mined without pervasive fraud or manipulation
  • Executive authority cannot be expanded beyond con­sti­tu­tion­al limits
  • The leg­is­la­ture is able to effec­tive­ly limit executive power
  • The judiciary is able to effec­tive­ly limit executive power
  • The elected branches respect judicial independence
  • Voter par­tic­i­pa­tion in elections is generally high
  • Information about the sources of campaign funding is available to the public
  • Public policy is not deter­mined by large campaign contributions
  • Citizens can make their opinions heard in open debate about policies that are under consideration
  • The geo­graph­ic bound­aries of electoral districts do not sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly advantage any par­tic­u­lar political party
  • Even when there are dis­agree­ments about ideology or policy, political leaders generally share a common under­stand­ing of relevant facts
  • Elected officials seek com­pro­mise with political opponents
  • Citizens have access to infor­ma­tion about can­di­dates that is relevant to how they would govern
  • Government protects indi­vid­u­als’ right to engage in peaceful protest
  • Law enforce­ment inves­ti­ga­tions of public officials or their asso­ciates are free from political influence or interference
  • Government sta­tis­tics and data are produced by experts who are not influ­enced by political considerations
  • The law is enforced equally for all persons
  • Incumbent politi­cians who lose elections publicly concede defeat
  • Universities, busi­ness­es, and pro­fes­sion­al orga­ni­za­tions operate inde­pen­dent­ly of gov­ern­ment pressure
  • Military lead­er­ship remains polit­i­cal­ly neutral and does not favor or support any political party or candidate
  • Officeholders do not use the military to advance political agendas or intim­i­date political opponents
  • Law enforce­ment remains polit­i­cal­ly neutral and does not favor or support any political party or candidate
  • Officeholders do not use law enforce­ment to advance political agendas or intim­i­date political opponents


Notably, expert ratings changed sig­nif­i­cant­ly (p<.01) for just two prin­ci­ples between September 2025 and February–March 2026 — more experts said that the judiciary effec­tive­ly limits the executive (18% in September versus 32% in February–March) and that the military is not exploited to advance political agendas or intim­i­date political opponents (20% in September versus 45% in February–March). These shifts may reflect the Supreme Court ruling against Trump on tariffs (an event that 87% of experts view as a benefit to democracy; see below) and the with­draw­al of National Guard deploy­ments from several cities in January 2026 (77% pre­vi­ous­ly rated Trump’s deploy­ment of the National Guard to Los Angeles as a serious or extra­or­di­nary threat to democracy).

Among the public, per­for­mance ratings only changed sig­nif­i­cant­ly since September 2025 for Democrats on one principle — an improve­ment in the neu­tral­i­ty of military lead­er­ship. Republicans perceive sig­nif­i­cant improve­ments on that principle as well as the pre­ven­tion of political violence, judicial checks on the executive, gov­ern­ment inter­fer­ence with the press, inde­pen­dent law enforce­ment inves­ti­ga­tions of public officials, and not using agencies against political opponents. 

We also asked experts and the public to rate the impor­tance of these prin­ci­ples to democracy. 


We observe no sig­nif­i­cant change among experts. Public ratings were also largely stable. However, we observe several troubling changes — a sig­nif­i­cant decrease in the per­cent­age of Democrats saying pre­vent­ing political violence is important as well as sig­nif­i­cant declines in the share of Republicans endorsing the pro­tec­tion of free speech, con­sti­tu­tion­al and judicial limits on the executive, and respon­sive­ness to public opinion. 

Actual and potential threats to democracy

Bright Line Watch asks experts to evaluate whether and to what extent recent actions or events pose a threat or benefit to U.S. democracy. The full list of events asked of experts in the December 2025–January 2026 and February–March 2026 surveys is listed in the dropdown below.

Events (December 2025–January 2026 survey)
  • Trump pardons Juan Orlando Hernandez, the former president of Honduras, who was serving 45 years in prison for helping drug traf­fick­ers import cocaine to the U.S.
  • Trump directs Attorney General Pam Bondi to prosecute his political enemies in a Truth Social message.
  • The Defense Department demands news outlets sign a pledge not to gather any infor­ma­tion that hasn’t been autho­rized for release.
  • Trump admin­is­tra­tion asks uni­ver­si­ties to join its Compact for Academic Excellence in Higher Education, which would increase federal control of uni­ver­si­ty policies.
  • Universities refuse to sign the Trump administration’s Compact for Academic Excellence in Higher Education, which would increase federal control of uni­ver­si­ty policies.
  • The U.S. military destroys more than twenty boats alleged to be carrying drugs.
  • U.S. military kills two survivors of an initial military strike in a second strike on an alleged drug smuggling boat.
  • Trump acknowl­edges that he is inel­i­gi­ble to run for a third term.
  • Six Democratic lawmakers with military or intel­li­gence back­grounds issue a video stating that military personnel should not obey unlawful orders.
  • Trump accuses Democratic lawmakers of “seditious behavior, pun­ish­able by death” for releasing a video stating that military personnel should not obey unlawful orders.
  • Federal judge dismisses federal criminal cases against former FBI Director James Comey and New York Attorney General Letitia James.
  • Trump pardons his former attorney and chief of staff as well as nearly 80 other allies accused of plotting to overturn the 2020 election.
  • The Department of Justice sues 18 states to access voter data.
  • FBI Director Kash Patel shuts down the FBI’s public cor­rup­tion inves­ti­ga­tion unit and fires agents who worked on inves­ti­ga­tions related to Trump.
  • State Department issues policy to deny visas to appli­cants who have worked in content mod­er­a­tion, fact-checking, or combating misinformation.
  • Federal judge rules Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s attempts to condition Harvard’s federal funding on policy changes violate the First Amendment.
  • Federal judge orders release of Kilmar Abrego Garcia, finding the Trump admin­is­tra­tion misled the court and detained him without lawful authority.
  • Estimated 7 million Americans par­tic­i­pate in October “No Kings” protests across approx­i­mate­ly 2,700 cities—the largest single-day demon­stra­tion in U.S. history.
  • More than 600 people are fired, suspended, or inves­ti­gat­ed for their speech about the killing of Charlie Kirk.
  • The U.S. carries out strikes against Venezuela and captures Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.
  • Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announces pro­ceed­ings aimed at reducing Senator Mark Kelly’s rank and retire­ment pay over his state­ments in a video asserting that military personnel should not obey unlawful orders.

Events (February–March 2026 survey)
  • Donald Trump writes on Truth Social that a federal judge who ruled against him “should be IMPEACHED!!!”
  • The Department of Justice begins a criminal inves­ti­ga­tion into Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell.
  • Federal agents fatally shoot Renée Good during immi­gra­tion oper­a­tions in Minnesota.
  • Federal agents fatally shoot Alex Pretti during immi­gra­tion oper­a­tions in Minnesota.
  • Federal judges rule that Lindsey Halligan and Alina Habba were unlaw­ful­ly appointed as U.S. Attorneys.
  • The Trump admin­is­tra­tion issues executive orders that impose penalties on some major law firms.
  • ICE disobeys 96 court orders in the District of Minnesota in January, according to Chief U.S. District Judge Patrick J. Schiltz.
  • The jour­nal­ist Don Lemon is charged with federal civil rights crimes after live-streaming a protest at a church in St. Paul, Minnesota.
  • FBI agents search a Fulton County, Georgia election center for ballots from the 2020 election with the Director of National Intelligence present.
  • U.S. attorneys’ offices ask job appli­cants to explain how they would advance President Trump’s policy priorities.
  • President Trump calls for Republican officials to “nation­al­ize” voting, which is admin­is­tered at the state and local level.
  • The Trump admin­is­tra­tion oversees Venezuelan oil sales and holds proceeds in offshore, U.S.-controlled accounts while directing how funds are spent.
  • The Department of Health and Human Services freezes $10 billion in childcare funding for 5 Democratic-led states due to alleged fraud.
  • An invest­ment firm tied to the United Arab Emirates invests $500 million into the Trump family’s cryp­tocur­ren­cy company days before Trump’s inauguration.
  • The DOJ issues subpoenas to five Minnesota Democratic leaders, including Governor Tim Walz and Minneapolis mayor Jacob Frey, inves­ti­gat­ing their response to federal immi­gra­tion enforcement.
  • Attorney General Pam Bondi asks Minnesota Governor Tim Walz for access to the state’s voter rolls.
  • FBI agents search the home of a Washington Post jour­nal­ist as part of a leak investigation.
  • In a court filing, DOJ lawyers acknowl­edge that DOGE employees signed an agreement with a political advocacy group seeking to match Social Security data against voter rolls to “overturn election results in certain States”.
  • President Trump creates a “Board of Peace” with himself as permanent chair and invites more than 30 countries to pay $1 billion for permanent membership.
  • The DOJ sues 24 states for unredact­ed access to voter reg­is­tra­tion lists.
  • The Trump admin­is­tra­tion finalizes a rule allowing for up to 50,000 federal career employees to lose job protections.
  • The Supreme Court rules that the president has “absolute immunity from criminal pros­e­cu­tion for actions within his con­clu­sive and preclu­sive con­sti­tu­tion­al authority” and “at least pre­sump­tive immunity from pros­e­cu­tion” for all official acts.
  • Donald Trump says “You have to vote for us” during a speech to troops at Fort Bragg.
  • The Department of Homeland Security sends admin­is­tra­tive subpoenas to tech companies request­ing personal infor­ma­tion about users whose social media accounts track or criticize the agency.
  • The Supreme Court rules that President Trump exceeded his authority to impose tariffs under existing law, inval­i­dat­ing many of the tariffs he imposed on foreign goods.
  • After the U.S. Supreme Court strikes down his previous tariff program, President Trump imposes a new temporary tariff of 15% on imports.
  • After the U.S. Supreme Court strikes down his previous tariff program, President Trump says “I am ashamed of certain Members of the Court” and says “[i]t is my opinion that the Court has been swayed by Foreign Interests.”
  • The United States and Israel launch coor­di­nat­ed military strikes on Iran in late February 2026.

Expert ratings of whether these events pose a threat or benefit to democracy are provided in the figures below for assess­ments provided by experts in our December 2025–January 2026 and February–March 2026 surveys.

Several recent events related to the rule of law were rated as a threat to democracy by 90% or more of experts and as a serious or extra­or­di­nary threat by 50% or more:

  • Trump directs Attorney General Pam Bondi to prosecute his political enemies in a Truth Social message (96% threat; 77% serious/extraordinary); 
  • FBI Director Kash Patel shuts down the FBI’s public cor­rup­tion inves­ti­ga­tion unit and fires agents who worked on inves­ti­ga­tions related to Trump (96% threat; 76% serious/extraordinary); 
  • Trump pardons his former attorney and chief of staff as well as nearly 80 other allies accused of plotting to overturn the 2020 election (95% threat; 78% serious/extraordinary); 
  • ICE disobeys 96 court orders in the District of Minnesota in January, according to Chief U.S. District Judge Patrick J. Schiltz (94% threat; 79% serious/extraordinary); 
  • The DOJ issues subpoenas to five Minnesota Democratic leaders, including Governor Tim Walz and Minneapolis mayor Jacob Frey, inves­ti­gat­ing their response to federal immi­gra­tion enforce­ment (90% threat; 72% serious or extraordinary).

We also asked experts to ret­ro­spec­tive­ly assess the perceived threat to democracy from two past actions related to the rule of law. In total, 93% of experts said that the 2024 Supreme Court ruling that the president has “absolute immunity from criminal pros­e­cu­tion for actions within his con­clu­sive and preclu­sive con­sti­tu­tion­al authority” and “at least pre­sump­tive immunity from pros­e­cu­tion” for all official acts is a threat to democracy, including 88% who said it was a serious or extra­or­di­nary threat. The Trump administration’s decision to issue executive orders that impose penalties on some major law firms was also seen as a threat by 92% of experts (55% serious/extraordinary).

A number of other events that 90% or more of experts see as a threat to democracy and 50% or more see as a serious or extra­or­di­nary threat relate to elections and speech: 

  • The Department of Homeland Security sends admin­is­tra­tive subpoenas to tech companies request­ing personal infor­ma­tion about users whose social media accounts track or criticize the agency (95% threat; 86% serious/extraordinary);
  • President Trump calls for Republican officials to “nation­al­ize” voting, which is admin­is­tered at the state and local level (93% threat; 85% serious/extraordinary);
  • Trump accuses Democratic lawmakers of “seditious behavior, pun­ish­able by death” for releasing a video stating that military personnel should not obey unlawful orders (93% threat; 73% serious/extraordinary);
  • The Defense Department demands news outlets sign a pledge not to gather any infor­ma­tion that hasn’t been autho­rized for release (93% threat; 60% serious/extraordinary);
  • FBI agents search a Fulton County, Georgia election center for ballots from the 2020 election with the Director of National Intelligence present (90% threat; 82% serious/extraordinary).

By contrast, experts were less unified on per­cep­tions of demo­c­ra­t­ic threat related to the Trump administration’s actions toward Venezuela and Iran:

  • The U.S. carries out strikes against Venezuela and captures Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro (72% threat; 45% serious/extraordinary);
  • U.S. military kills two survivors of an initial military strike in a second strike on an alleged drug smuggling boat (72% threat; 41% serious/extraordinary).
  • The Trump admin­is­tra­tion oversees Venezuelan oil sales and holds proceeds in offshore, U.S.-controlled accounts while directing how funds are spent (70% threat; 45% serious/extraordinary);
  • The U.S. military destroys more than twenty boats alleged to be carrying drugs (64% threat; 31% serious/extraordinary); 
  • The United States and Israel launch coor­di­nat­ed military strikes on Iran in late February 2026 (54% threat; 40% serious/extraordinary).

Finally, the figure below reports the events of the second Trump admin­is­tra­tion that experts rate as the most sig­nif­i­cant threats to democracy, ranked by the per­cent­age who identify the threats as serious or extraordinary. 


Approval of the events that experts rated as threats to democracy in the surveys was wide­spread among Republicans, par­tic­u­lar­ly those who identify as more of a Trump supporter than a supporter of the Republican Party (see chart in appendix). Notably, we found wide­spread GOP approval of federal agents fatally shooting Renée Good (62%) and Alex Pretti (61%) during immi­gra­tion oper­a­tions in Minnesota, including 73% and 81%, respec­tive­ly, among those who identify as more of a Trump supporter.

Election con­fi­dence

With the 2026 midterms approach­ing, Donald Trump and his allies are again raising unfounded questions about the integrity of the American election system. During his State of the Union address, for instance, Trump said “[Democrats] want to cheat. They have cheated. And their policy is so bad that their only way to get elected is to cheat.” He is using claims like these to campaign for the SAVE America Act, saying “It’ll guarantee the midterms. If you don’t get it, big trouble. My opinion. If you get this… they won’t be able to cheat.”

Statements like these threaten to undermine public con­fi­dence in the outcome of the election, as they did after 2020, which resulted in most Republicans con­tin­u­ing to refuse to accept Joe Biden as the rightful winner of the election (see appendix). The New York Times, for instance, reported, “With his words and deeds, the president — who pushed to overturn his 2020 defeat but declared his 2024 victory legit­i­mate — appears to be under­min­ing Americans’ trust that the midterms will be free and fair.”

To date, however, this pattern we saw after the 2020 election of dramatic polar­iza­tion in con­fi­dence in the election system has not recurred. As the figure below shows, public con­fi­dence that votes nation­wide will be counted as voters intend is com­pa­ra­ble to the levels observed before the 2020 election and not sharply polarized. In fact, despite Trump’s rhetoric, Republicans (70%) are more likely to indicate that they are somewhat or very confident in the vote count than are Democrats (55%). 


Voter con­fi­dence is also less polarized now than it was in the periods before the 2022 and 2024 elections. 

Trump is most likely to reduce con­fi­dence in the 2026 election among his sup­port­ers after it takes place, the moment when the public is most attentive and the losing side is most sus­pi­cious. In 2020, con­fi­dence in the election among Republicans only dropped sharply after the election, plum­met­ing from 58% in October to 30% in November. No similar pattern took place after the two most recent national elections, but the GOP performed better than expected in 2022 and Trump won in 2024. He accord­ing­ly did not have a strong reason to challenge the results. The 2026 election may create different incen­tives. With Democrats heavily favored to at least win back the House of Representatives and possibly the Senate, Trump could try to undermine the legit­i­ma­cy of the results among his sup­port­ers as he did in 2020. 

Appendix

Bright Line Watch conducted its 27th and 28th surveys of academic experts from December 22, 2025–January 7, 2026 and February 19–March 10, 2026, respec­tive­ly. We conducted our 24th and 25th surveys of the American public from December 22, 2025–January 6, 2026 and February 24–March 7, 2026, respec­tive­ly. Our public samples each consisted of 2,750 par­tic­i­pants from the YouGov panel who were selected and weighted to be rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the U.S. adult pop­u­la­tion. We also surveyed political science experts across a diverse range of subfields (564 in the first survey and 621 in the second). Our email list was con­struct­ed from the faculty list of U.S. insti­tu­tions rep­re­sent­ed in the online program of the 2024 American Political Science Association con­fer­ence. Estimates from the public surveys use weights provided by YouGov. Estimates from the expert surveys are unweight­ed because we do not collect demo­graph­ic data to protect anonymity. Error bars in our graphs represent 95% con­fi­dence intervals. Data are available here.

37 democratic principles

  • Government officials are legally sanc­tioned for misconduct
  • Government officials do not use public office for private gain
  • Government agencies are not used to monitor, attack, or punish political opponents
  • All adult citizens enjoy the same legal and political rights
  • Government does not interfere with jour­nal­ists or news organizations
  • Government effec­tive­ly prevents private actors from engaging in polit­i­cal­ly-motivated violence or intimidation
  • Government protects indi­vid­u­als’ right to engage in unpopular speech or expression
  • Political com­pe­ti­tion occurs without criticism of opponents’ loyalty or patriotism
  • Elections are free from foreign influence
  • Parties and can­di­dates are not barred due to their political beliefs and ideologies
  • All adult citizens have equal oppor­tu­ni­ty to vote
  • All votes have equal impact on election outcomes
  • Elections are conducted, ballots counted, and winners deter­mined without pervasive fraud or manipulation
  • Executive authority cannot be expanded beyond con­sti­tu­tion­al limits
  • The leg­is­la­ture is able to effec­tive­ly limit executive power
  • The judiciary is able to effec­tive­ly limit executive power
  • Lower courts are able to effec­tive­ly limit executive power
  • The Supreme Court is able to effec­tive­ly limit executive power
  • The elected branches respect judicial independence
  • Voter par­tic­i­pa­tion in elections is generally high
  • Information about the sources of campaign funding is available to the public
  • Public policy is not deter­mined by large campaign contributions
  • Citizens can make their opinions heard in open debate about policies that are under consideration
  • The geo­graph­ic bound­aries of electoral districts do not sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly advantage any par­tic­u­lar political party
  • Even when there are dis­agree­ments about ideology or policy, political leaders generally share a common under­stand­ing of relevant facts
  • Elected officials seek com­pro­mise with political opponents
  • Citizens have access to infor­ma­tion about can­di­dates that is relevant to how they would govern
  • Government protects indi­vid­u­als’ right to engage in peaceful protest
  • Law enforce­ment inves­ti­ga­tions of public officials or their asso­ciates are free from political influence or interference
  • Government sta­tis­tics and data are produced by experts who are not influ­enced by political considerations
  • The law is enforced equally for all persons
  • Incumbent politi­cians who lose elections publicly concede defeat
  • Universities, busi­ness­es, and pro­fes­sion­al orga­ni­za­tions operate inde­pen­dent­ly of gov­ern­ment pressure
  • Military lead­er­ship remains polit­i­cal­ly neutral and does not favor or support any political party or candidate
  • Officeholders do not use the military to advance political agendas or intim­i­date political opponents
  • Law enforce­ment remains polit­i­cal­ly neutral and does not favor or support any political party or candidate
  • Officeholders do not use law enforce­ment to advance political agendas or intim­i­date political opponents

Public approval of wave 27 events

Public approval of wave 28 events