Erosion of the rule of law in Trump’s second term

Bright Line Watch February–March 2026 survey

From February 19–March 6, 2026, Bright Line Watch and the Safeguarding Democracy Project at UCLA Law conducted their first joint survey of legal experts — federal judges, lawyers, and law pro­fes­sors — alongside Bright Line Watch’s frequent surveys of political sci­en­tists and the public. 

The results provide the most detailed picture to date of experts’ assess­ment of the state of the U.S. legal system during Trump’s second term. The federal judges, elite lawyers, and academics in our sample perceive a sig­nif­i­cant erosion of the rule of law since Trump returned to office, including politi­cized law enforce­ment, a dys­func­tion­al sep­a­ra­tion of powers, and executive-branch overreach. Legal experts generally view the erosion of the rule of law as more severe than the public currently perceives it to be.

We surveyed the following legal experts: 21 Article III federal judges, 113 elite lawyers, and 193 law pro­fes­sors. Survey invi­ta­tions for Article III federal judges were sent to lists of active and senior judges in the U.S. District Courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. We invited elite lawyers by sending invi­ta­tions to the mem­ber­ship lists of the American Law Institute, the National Association of Former United States Attorneys, and the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers; the leaders of the American Bar Association and members who serve in gov­er­nance roles in it; and state Attorneys General. Law pro­fes­sors were recruited from the faculty of the law schools ranked in the top 50 in the 2025 U.S. News & World Report rankings (55 due to ties). 

The respond­ing Article III federal judges are active (33%) or senior (67%) and primarily serve at the U.S. District Court level (92%). They were nominated by both Democratic and Republican pres­i­dents (54% and 46%, respec­tive­ly); 14% identify as legal con­ser­v­a­tives by the def­i­n­i­tion below and the rest as legal liberals. All have served more than ten years on the bench. 

The elite lawyers we survey are primarily attorneys in private practice (69%), but 57% have past or current gov­ern­ment service expe­ri­ence in the law. They have a median of 35 years of legal expe­ri­ence and mostly identify as legal liberals (82%). Law professor respon­dents are primarily tenure-track, tenured, or emeritus faculty (81%) and over­whelm­ing­ly identify as legal liberals (89%). Approximately half work at public uni­ver­si­ties (51%); almost all of the rest are at private insti­tu­tions (46%). The elite lawyers and law pro­fes­sors in our sample have served as heads of law-firm appellate or Supreme Court practices (9), U.S. Supreme Court clerks (6), high-level Department of Justice officials (4), high-level White House or executive branch officials (4), U.S. attorneys (4), state supreme court justices (4), Fortune 500 general counsels or chief legal officers (4), state attorneys general (2), and state solicitor general (1). 

Below we report overall sta­tis­tics for legal experts when responses are not mea­sur­ably different between subgroups (federal judges, elite lawyers, and law pro­fes­sors) and report them sep­a­rate­ly otherwise. Similarly, when dif­fer­ences are mea­sur­able, we also dis­ag­gre­gate between legal expert respon­dents who said the Supreme Court should base rulings on its under­stand­ing of what the Constitution meant as it was orig­i­nal­ly written, whom we call legal con­ser­v­a­tives (34 respon­dents; 14% of the legal expert sample), and those who say the Court should base its rulings on what it thinks the Constitution means in current times, whom we call legal liberals (87% of the legal expert sample). However, due to sample size lim­i­ta­tions and imbal­ances in phi­los­o­phy, we often cannot dis­tin­guish sta­tis­ti­cal­ly between these subgroups. We also note that the legal expert samples we consider are not nec­es­sar­i­ly rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the pop­u­la­tions from which they are drawn; we inten­tion­al­ly do not gather iden­ti­fy­ing data to ensure their par­tic­i­pa­tion, so we are limited in our ability to assess their composition.

We also sep­a­rate­ly surveyed political science experts from the faculty list of U.S. insti­tu­tions rep­re­sent­ed in the online program of the 2024 American Political Science Association con­fer­ence and 2,750 par­tic­i­pants from the YouGov panel who were selected and weighted to be rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the U.S. adult pop­u­la­tion. Estimates from the public surveys use weights provided by YouGov. Estimates from the expert surveys are unweight­ed because we do not track respon­dent identity or measure demo­graph­ic data to protect anonymity. 

(Response rates and sample details are provided in the appendix below. Additional descrip­tive sta­tis­tics about our legal expert par­tic­i­pants are provided here.)

Our key findings are the following:

The state of the rule of law

• We asked legal experts to rate adherence to the rule of law in the U.S. today and to offer ret­ro­spec­tive and prospec­tive assess­ments on a 0–100 scale. They rate today as the lowest point in at least a decade  — below their ret­ro­spec­tive ratings of 2015, 2017, 2020, 2021, and 2024 — and project no change by 2027 and only modest improve­ment by 2032. Federal judges rate the rule of law in the U.S. today more pos­i­tive­ly than do elite lawyers or law pro­fes­sors, though still below their own assess­ments of 2021 and 2015. 

• Unlike our overall sample, which is mostly made up of legal liberals, legal con­ser­v­a­tives view the rule of law today in the U.S. as not mea­sur­ably different from 2015. They rate the rule of law as stable from 2015–2021, declining by 2024, and recov­er­ing by 2026.

• Legal experts (except for legal con­ser­v­a­tives) place the U.S. closer to the ratings they give to a hypo­thet­i­cal partial rule of law country than a strong rule of law country.

• When asked to comment on the most important threat to the rule of law in the U.S., three in four federal judges who answered the question expressed explicit or implicit concern about the Trump admin­is­tra­tion, including all seven Democrat-appointed judges and two of five Republican-appointed judges. One Republican-appointed Court of Appeals judge wrote that “The nation is strong as is its com­mit­ment to the rule of law, but the current president presents the greatest threat in decades.”

• Three of twelve legal con­ser­v­a­tive law pro­fes­sors faulted Trump or the GOP in their comments. And more than half of the elite lawyers and law pro­fes­sors who served in high-level gov­ern­ment roles (U.S. attorney, state Supreme Court justice) explic­it­ly or implic­it­ly cited the Trump admin­is­tra­tion in their responses. 

Threat comparisons across administrations

• A majority of legal experts say Trump’s second term poses a greater threat to the rule of law than either Trump’s first term or Biden’s pres­i­den­cy. A majority of legal con­ser­v­a­tives share this view, though one in three view Trump’s second term as a lesser threat than Biden’s presidency.

• More than half of all Americans see Trump’s second term posing a greater threat to the  rule of law than his first term and Biden’s presidency. 

State of the judiciary

• Most legal experts agree that Trump is using executive power exces­sive­ly. Of those, legal con­ser­v­a­tives are far more likely than legal liberals to say the Supreme Court is con­strain­ing Trump. Divisions are narrower for lower courts, which both legal liberals and con­ser­v­a­tives see as con­strain­ing Trump.

• Only a minority of legal experts are confident that the Supreme Court will handle Trump admin­is­tra­tion cases impar­tial­ly — a figure that masks a vast divide between legal con­ser­v­a­tives (who are over­whelm­ing­ly confident) and liberals (who are not). 

• Approximately one in three legal liberals and one in six con­ser­v­a­tives say that lower courts and the Supreme Court are influ­enced by fears of threats or reprisals by the executive branch.

• Only two in ten legal experts agree that the Supreme Court has made appro­pri­ate use of the emergency docket since Trump’s return to office, though more than half of legal con­ser­v­a­tives agree.

Politicization of justice

• Nine in ten legal experts say the Trump admin­is­tra­tion has used the Department of Justice (DOJ) to go after enemies and provide benefits to allies. Legal liberals say these actions happen more fre­quent­ly under Trump than Biden; legal con­ser­v­a­tives disagree.

• More than ninety percent of legal experts believe that the pros­e­cu­tion of New York Attorney General Letitia James and of former FBI Director James Comey were motivated by politics. (Our survey asked about Comey’s first pros­e­cu­tion.) These two pros­e­cu­tions were viewed dif­fer­ent­ly than several other cases involving political figures in which experts were divided or saw politics as playing little role. 

• Only one in five legal experts agree the federal gov­ern­ment still merits the “pre­sump­tion of reg­u­lar­i­ty” in court (the doctrine that courts should presume gov­ern­ment officials act lawfully and in good faith absent clear evidence to the contrary). Fewer than half of federal judges and only one in four elite lawyers believed that the gov­ern­ment still merits the pre­sump­tion of reg­u­lar­i­ty. Only a narrow majority of legal con­ser­v­a­tives agree the pre­sump­tion is still warranted.

• Eight in ten legal experts report that federal officials fail to comply with court orders somewhat or very often, and nearly nine in ten say political appointees in the Trump DOJ mislead federal judges somewhat or very often. All expert subgroups except legal con­ser­v­a­tives perceive these trans­gres­sions to be more prevalent under the second Trump admin­is­tra­tion than under the Biden administration.

Fear of reprisals among federal judges, elite lawyers, and law professors

• Nearly one in five elite lawyers report that rep­re­sen­ta­tion decisions by their firms have often been affected by fear of adverse action by gov­ern­ment officials or agencies during the Trump admin­is­tra­tion, compared to virtually none who say the same about the Biden admin­is­tra­tion. Hiring decisions show the same pattern.

• Almost half of federal judges are concerned about harass­ment if they rule against the federal gov­ern­ment, but fears of violence are much less common. Substantial minori­ties of elite lawyers are concerned about facing legal sanctions or pro­fes­sion­al con­se­quences for taking a legal action against the government. 

Core rule of law principles

• Legal experts say standards are not being met for nearly every insti­tu­tion­al check on executive power: majori­ties say the Constitution, leg­is­la­ture, and judiciary (including both the lower courts and the Supreme Court) are failing to limit the executive and that the standard of judicial inde­pen­dence is not being met. 

• Legal con­ser­v­a­tives are sub­stan­tial­ly more confident than legal liberals in the limits from the Constitution and the Supreme Court and in judicial inde­pen­dence, though majori­ties agree that leg­isla­tive limits on the executive are not being upheld.

• On most rule of law and anti-cor­rup­tion prin­ci­ples, legal liberals and con­ser­v­a­tives rate U.S. per­for­mance as poor. Less than a fourth of legal experts believe that U.S. gov­ern­ment agencies do not punish political opponents, law enforce­ment is not exploited for political purposes and remains neutral, inves­ti­ga­tions of public officials are not com­pro­mised, gov­ern­ment officials face sanctions for mis­con­duct, and gov­ern­ment officials do not use public office for private gain. Legal experts also express little con­fi­dence in U.S. per­for­mance on civil liberties and freedom of expres­sion principles.

Confidence in institutions

• Legal experts indicate high con­fi­dence in federal district and circuit courts and the Federal Reserve, but very few express con­fi­dence in other insti­tu­tions such as the Supreme Court, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the pres­i­den­cy, and Congress. Legal con­ser­v­a­tives are more likely than legal liberals to express con­fi­dence in many institutions.

Threats to the rule of law

• Legal experts identify numerous recent events as posing serious or extra­or­di­nary threats to the rule of law, including the Department of Homeland Security sub­poe­naing user data for anti-ICE accounts from tech companies, a federal judge finding that ICE disobeyed nearly 100 court orders in Minnesota, and Trump pardoning defen­dants in January 6 cases. On the other hand, a strong majority of legal experts consider the Supreme Court ruling against Trump’s tariffs to be an extra­or­di­nary or serious benefit to the rule of law. These assess­ments do not vary sig­nif­i­cant­ly across pro­fes­sion­al subgroups.

Overall state of rule of law

Bright Line Watch and UCLA Law’s Safeguarding Democracy Project asked legal expert respon­dents to rate the current state of the rule of law in the United States on a 0–100 scale. Participants were also asked to provide ret­ro­spec­tive ratings for 2015, 2017, 2020, 2021, and 2024 as well as projected ratings for 2027 and 2032. 

Overall, legal experts rated the rule of law in the U.S. today at its lowest point since 2015, con­sis­tent with the broader pattern of demo­c­ra­t­ic erosion doc­u­ment­ed in previous BLW surveys of political sci­en­tists. This pattern holds across all three legal expert subgroups surveyed: federal judges, elite lawyers, and law professors. 

Legal experts (the black dots in the figure) rated the rule of law highest for 2015. Ratings  declined for 2017 and 2020, recovered slightly for 2021, then fell again to approx­i­mate­ly 2020 levels for 2024. Legal expert ratings of the rule of law for 2026 are the lowest observed for the post-2015 period, though assess­ments differ by pro­fes­sion. Federal judges rate the current U.S. rule of law the highest, though still mean­ing­ful­ly below their eval­u­a­tions for 2021 and 2015, while law pro­fes­sors and elite lawyers offer more pes­simistic assess­ments. Legal experts expect little change in the rule of law by 2027 and only a slight improve­ment by 2032 that would still leave the U.S. below prior rule-of-law levels.

By contrast, dis­ag­gre­gat­ing by legal phi­los­o­phy reveals a sharp diver­gence in assess­ments of the rule of law today and how it has changed since 2015. 

Unlike legal liberals, who perceive a sub­stan­tial decline in the rule of law during Trump’s first term, a partial recovery during Biden’s term, and a larger decline during Trump’s second term, legal con­ser­v­a­tive ratings of the rule of law today are not mea­sur­ably different from their ratings for 2015. The only sig­nif­i­cant decrease in the rule of law that legal con­ser­v­a­tives perceive in the post-2015 period is between the beginning of Trump’s first term and the end of Biden’s term (from 2017 to 2024). Both subgroups project no mea­sur­able change by 2027, but both expect improve­ment by 2032.

To con­tex­tu­al­ize these ratings, we asked the legal experts to rate the rule of law in three hypo­thet­i­cal countries described in the dropdown table below using the same 0–100 scale — a country with strong rule of law, one in which the rule of law is partially com­pro­mised, and a country with little or no rule of law. 

Hypothetical rule of law systems

• Strong rule of law
  - Judges are appointed through merit-based pro­ce­dures and serve with full inde­pen­dence; courts regularly review and strike down unlawful executive actions; the elected branches respect judicial inde­pen­dence.
  - Prosecutors and law enforce­ment agencies operate inde­pen­dent­ly of political direction; charging decisions are insulated from political influence; inves­ti­ga­tions of public officials are free from inter­fer­ence.
  - The law is enforced equally for all persons regard­less of political affil­i­a­tion or status; gov­ern­ment officials are con­sis­tent­ly held legally account­able for mis­con­duct.
  - Government protects indi­vid­u­als’ rights to free expres­sion, peaceful protest, and press freedom; gov­ern­ment agencies are not used to monitor, target, or punish political opponents.
  - Universities, busi­ness­es, and pro­fes­sion­al orga­ni­za­tions operate inde­pen­dent­ly of gov­ern­ment pressure; official sta­tis­tics and audit insti­tu­tions function without political inter­fer­ence.
  - Government officials do not use public office for private gain; office­hold­ers do not use law enforce­ment to advance political agendas or intim­i­date opponents; executive authority is effec­tive­ly con­strained by con­sti­tu­tion­al limits.
  
• Partial rule of law
  - Judges are appointed through mixed pro­ce­dures subject to executive influence; the judiciary is partly inde­pen­dent; courts sometimes but not con­sis­tent­ly review executive actions; the elected branches inter­mit­tent­ly challenge judicial authority.
  - Prosecutors and law enforce­ment agencies are partially sub­or­di­nate to the executive; charging decisions are sometimes influ­enced by political con­sid­er­a­tions; inves­ti­ga­tions of public officials occa­sion­al­ly face political pressure.
  - The law is unevenly enforced, with political status sometimes affecting outcomes; gov­ern­ment officials are occa­sion­al­ly but not con­sis­tent­ly held account­able for mis­con­duct.
  - Government generally protects rights to expres­sion and protest but selec­tive­ly restricts press access or targets critics through admin­is­tra­tive means; agencies occa­sion­al­ly monitor or pressure political opponents.
  - Universities, busi­ness­es, and pro­fes­sion­al orga­ni­za­tions face periodic gov­ern­ment pressure; official sta­tis­tics and audit insti­tu­tions are subject to occa­sion­al political influence over timing or pre­sen­ta­tion of reports.
  - Some gov­ern­ment officials use public office for private advantage with limited con­se­quences; law enforce­ment is sometimes used to advance political agendas; executive authority occa­sion­al­ly exceeds con­sti­tu­tion­al limits with weak enforce­ment of constraints.
  
• Little/no rule of law
  - Judges are appointed at the exec­u­tive’s dis­cre­tion and lack inde­pen­dence; courts do not mean­ing­ful­ly review executive actions; the executive routinely dis­re­gards or retal­i­ates against judicial decisions.
  - Prosecutors and law enforce­ment agencies are directed by political leaders; charging decisions follow political direc­tives; inves­ti­ga­tions of public officials are initiated or sup­pressed based on political loyalty.
  - The law is enforced selec­tive­ly based on political affil­i­a­tion; allies of the gov­ern­ment face minimal legal account­abil­i­ty while opponents face dis­pro­por­tion­ate scrutiny and pros­e­cu­tion.
  - Government restricts expres­sion, protest, and press freedom; agencies routinely monitor, target, and punish political opponents and critics.
  - Universities, busi­ness­es, and pro­fes­sion­al orga­ni­za­tions are subject to direct gov­ern­ment control and coercion; official sta­tis­tics and audit reports are con­trolled, delayed, or sup­pressed by political leaders.
  - Government officials use public office for private gain without con­se­quence; office­hold­ers routinely use law enforce­ment to advance political agendas and intim­i­date opponents; executive authority is uncon­strained by con­sti­tu­tion­al limits.
  

Unlike the polarized ratings we observe for the U.S., legal con­ser­v­a­tives and liberals do not differ in their eval­u­a­tions of any hypo­thet­i­cal country, and pro­fes­sion­al subgroups differ in only one case (law pro­fes­sors rate the strong rule of law country higher than do elite lawyers). Most notably, legal con­ser­v­a­tives are the only subgroup that rates the current U.S. as closest to the strong rule of law hypo­thet­i­cal. Lawyers, law pro­fes­sors, and liberals all rate the U.S. as currently closest to the country with the partial rule of law system.

Notably, the ratings that legal experts give to the rule of law in the U.S. since 2015 track closely with ratings of U.S. democracy by political science experts, which we have collected con­tem­po­ra­ne­ous­ly since 2017.

Ratings of the rule of law by legal experts and ratings of democracy by political science experts are at their lowest since 2015. In simul­ta­ne­ous February–March 2026 surveys, political sci­en­tists placed the United States closest to an illiberal democracy—consistent with legal experts’ assess­ment that U.S. rule of law most closely resembles a partial rule of law system. 

Legal expert comments about the rule of law

Open-text responses to a question about the state of the rule of law in the U.S. and the single most important threat to it help illus­trate the range of views that legal experts hold. Most notably, nine of twelve federal judges who answered the question expressed explicit or implicit concern about the Trump admin­is­tra­tion, including all seven Democrat-appointed judges and two of five Republican-appointed judges. For instance, a U.S. District Court judge wrote that “The President and Vice President of the United States is the single most [important] threat to the rule of law, with the Supreme Court majority ranking a close second.” Another wrote that “Lawlessness is rampant. The rule of law is on a precipice in the United States. The current lead­er­ship in the Executive Branch and the lack of lead­er­ship in the Legislative Branch are a double-fisted threat to the rule of law.” Most strik­ing­ly, a Republican-appointed U.S. Court of Appeals judge wrote that “The nation is strong as is its com­mit­ment to the rule of law, but the current president presents the greatest threat in decades.” Another Republican appointee expressed concern indi­rect­ly, stating “it is the trial courts that are most engaged in main­tain­ing the Rule of Law and are most under threat.” Finally, a third GOP appointee pointed the blame elsewhere, writing that “The single most important threat to the rule of law currently is the law­less­ness of anti-ICE rioters and thugs who force­ful­ly interfere with our law enforce­ment officers who are doing their jobs.” 

Law pro­fes­sors and elite lawyers express a similar range of views. For instance, one law professor wrote that “the second Trump term has done damage that is irrepara­ble or at a minimum not reparable for gen­er­a­tions.” Another wrote that “The rule of law is under serious threat, but is not in imminent danger of collapse. The single biggest threat is Donald Trump’s per­son­al­ist and Caesarist view of the pres­i­den­cy.” These views are not confined to legal liberals. For instance, three of twelve legal con­ser­v­a­tive law pro­fes­sors surveyed fault Trump or the GOP. However, others disagree. One legal con­ser­v­a­tive law professor stated, for instance, that “Biden’s admin­is­tra­tion was the greatest threat to the rule of law probably in American history” and reports that they have “reluc­tant­ly concluded that the only way we are going to restore the rule of law is through a tit-for-tat strategy against the per­pe­tra­tors of this injustice.” Similarly, a legal liberal lawyer wrote “I abhor Donald Trump. However, I do not think the rule of law is under siege.” Another stated that the state of the rule of law is “abysmal” at the top levels of the Department of Justice but concluded that assistant US attorneys are “still doing their job and appear to be focused on facts, not political favor.” 

More than half of the elite lawyers and law pro­fes­sors who served in high-level roles such as U.S. attorney and state Supreme Court justice explic­it­ly or implic­it­ly cited the Trump admin­is­tra­tion when asked about the state of the rule of law and the single greatest threat to it. For example, a former U.S. attorney and legal con­ser­v­a­tive writes that “The rule of law is under threat because of Trump and his minions.” A former Trump admin­is­tra­tion official stated that the greatest threat is “enablers of Trump.” Two former White House counsels wrote that the rule of law is “in grave danger” and “under grave threat,” with both blaming Congress and one blaming the Supreme Court for not resisting the president. And a former U.S. attorney stated that the single greatest threat to the rule of law is “Using the Department of Justice to inves­ti­gate political opponents or critics.” Others cited other factors such as the “con­sol­i­da­tion of wealth and power channeled by Citizens United” (state attorney general) or placed the blame on Biden (U.S. attorney: “failure to uphold and enforce existing immi­gra­tion laws”) or multiple branches of gov­ern­ment (state supreme court justice).

The full set of comments is available here.

Comparative assessments of rule of law threats

We asked legal experts and survey respon­dents from a nation­al­ly rep­re­sen­ta­tive sample of the American public to assess the relative threats to the rule of law posed by Trump’s first term and by Biden’s pres­i­den­cy compared to Trump’s second term. These questions were derived from a survey of legal experts conducted by Emily Bazelon of The New York Times.

In total, 91% of legal experts rate Trump’s second term as more threat­en­ing to the rule of law than Biden’s pres­i­den­cy and 94% rate it as more threat­en­ing than Trump’s first term — views that do not differ mea­sur­ably between federal judges, elite lawyers, and law pro­fes­sors. Even majori­ties of legal con­ser­v­a­tives rate Trump’s second term as more of a threat than Biden’s term (57%) and Trump’s first term (73%), though legal liberals are much more likely to find Trump’s second term to be more threat­en­ing in both cases. 

These findings differ from the over-time ratings of the rule of law in the U.S. presented above, which showed that legal con­ser­v­a­tives rate the rule of law lower during Biden’s pres­i­den­cy than in Trump’s second term. In this case, however, 57% rate Trump’s second term as posing more of a threat to the rule of law than Biden’s (only 36% rate Biden’s pres­i­den­cy as a greater threat). One possible expla­na­tion is that legal con­ser­v­a­tives currently regard the rule of law as stronger under Trump than under Biden, but also perceive greater risk or have greater fears about the threat to the rule of law in Trump’s second term.

The public perceives Trump’s second term as bringing increas­ing threats to the rule of law, though per­cep­tions track closely with par­ti­san­ship. Six in ten public respon­dents (58%) regard Trump’s second term as threat­en­ing the rule of law more than Biden’s pres­i­den­cy, and 60% regard the threat as increased relative to Trump’s first term. The sense of increased threat is over­whelm­ing among Democrats (92% relative to Biden; 90% relative to Trump I). Partisan inde­pen­dents track the public overall closely (61% and 63%, respec­tive­ly). Republicans, by contrast, view Trump’s second term as more benign than Biden’s: 68% of Republicans regard Biden’s pres­i­den­cy as the more serious threat to the rule of law. 

The state of the judiciary

Constraints on excessive executive power

The judiciary’s ability to check executive authority is widely regarded as essential to the rule of law. We asked all respon­dents to assess the effec­tive­ness of the U.S. Supreme Court in checking excessive uses of executive power in the current Trump pres­i­den­cy. We also asked experts to assess the effec­tive­ness of federal district and circuit courts using the same question format. (We assumed the public would be largely unfa­mil­iar with courts below the Supreme Court.) Our overall legal expert sample aligns with the results of Emily Bazelon’s survey of legal experts in The New York Times, from which we adopted these questions.

Among the experts, we found much more positive assess­ments of judicial checks at the district and circuit court levels than for the Supreme Court. First, very few experts (less than 3% for any expert subgroup, except 11% for legal con­ser­v­a­tives) rejected the premise of the questions by respond­ing that President Trump is not using power excessively. 

Among those who indicate that Trump’s use of executive power is excessive, minori­ties of each expert subgroup said the lower courts are con­strain­ing excessive executive power “a lot” (29% among federal judges, 23% among elite lawyers, 18% among law pro­fes­sors, 29% among legal con­ser­v­a­tives, 23% among liberals, and 13% among political sci­en­tists). A majority of each subgroup (60–72%) regard the lower courts to be con­strain­ing excessive executive power “somewhat,” and smaller minori­ties (none of the judges or legal con­ser­v­a­tives and 12–17% among the other expert subgroups) regard the lower courts as inef­fec­tive on this count (con­strain­ing executive power “a little or not at all”). 

Assessments of the Supreme Court are less sanguine for all subgroups except federal judges and legal con­ser­v­a­tives. Among those subgroups, 7% or fewer regard the Court to be con­strain­ing excessive executive power “a lot,” while 30–53% say it only does so “somewhat.” For law pro­fes­sors, elite lawyers, legal liberals, and political sci­en­tists, the largest cohort (49–69%) said the Supreme Court is con­strain­ing excessive executive power “a little or not at all.” Federal judges were somewhat less negative, with 7% saying the Court con­strains executive power “a lot” and 53% saying “somewhat” versus 40% saying “a little or not at all.” Legal con­ser­v­a­tives were most opti­mistic, with 26% saying the Court con­strains executive power “a lot” and 63% saying it does so “somewhat,” leaving only 11% who say it con­strains executive power “a little or not at all” (among those who did not say Trump is not using executive power excessively).

Public eval­u­a­tions again reflect those of experts, but with a strong dose of partisan polar­iza­tion.  First, 15% of the public (including 36% of Republicans) reject the premise of the question, saying that Trump is not using power exces­sive­ly. Among respon­dents who do think Trump is using power exces­sive­ly, most regard the Supreme Court to be con­strain­ing excessive executive power only “somewhat” (36%) or “a little or not at all” (46%, including 52% of Democrats). By contrast, a majority of Republicans who do not dispute the premise of the question say the Supreme Court con­strains Trump’s excessive use of executive power “a lot” (12%) or “somewhat” (53%).

Confidence in Supreme Court impartiality

Legal experts overall also expressed limited con­fi­dence about the Supreme Court’s impar­tial­i­ty. Only minori­ties of the pro­fes­sion­al subgroups (47% among judges, 37% for elite lawyers, 25% for law pro­fes­sors, 28% among political sci­en­tists) said they are very or somewhat confident the Court will issue impartial decisions in cases involving the Trump admin­is­tra­tion — majori­ties in each pro­fes­sion­al subgroup said they are not very or not at all confident. Legal con­ser­v­a­tives, on the other hand, express con­fi­dence in the impar­tial­i­ty of the Supreme Court (82%) at a much higher rate than legal liberals (19%).

The public overall shares experts’ skep­ti­cism, with 43% saying they are very or somewhat confident compared to 57% who say they are not very or not at all confident in the Court’s impar­tial­i­ty. However, we again observe sharp polar­iza­tion, with 66% of Republican respon­dents saying they are confident compared to just 25% among Democrats and 39% among independents.

Judicial intimidation

To explore why judges might not act as effective checks on executive authority, we asked respon­dents to what extent they think lower court and Supreme Court justices are influ­enced by fears of threats and reprisals from the executive branch. 

Substantial minori­ties of legal experts expressed concern that fears of threats or reprisals from the executive branch influ­enced judges, with 28% saying lower court judges are influ­enced to a moderate or great extent and 31% saying so for Supreme Court justices. Political sci­en­tists were more likely to say that lower court judges are influ­enced than legal experts (43% vs. 28%), but do not differ sig­nif­i­cant­ly from them with respect to the Supreme Court (38% vs. 31%).

Legal liberals and con­ser­v­a­tives did not differ sig­nif­i­cant­ly with respect to lower court judges, but they did differ on Supreme Court justices: legal liberals were more likely than legal con­ser­v­a­tives to say that such fears influence justices to a moderate or great extent (34% vs. 14%). The only sig­nif­i­cant dif­fer­ence among pro­fes­sions is between elite lawyers and law pro­fes­sors on Court influence – the former were more likely than the latter to say that such fears influence justices to a moderate or great extent (45% vs. 22%).

Just over half of the public overall says that the Supreme Court is influ­enced by fears of threats or reprisals (we didn’t ask the public about lower courts) – a larger pro­por­tion than legal experts and political sci­en­tists (52%, 31%, and 38%, respec­tive­ly). The public is sig­nif­i­cant­ly polarized by party: a strong majority of Democrats perceive Supreme Court justices to be influ­enced by fears of threats and reprisals (73%) compared to only a minority of Republicans (28%).

Emergency docket

In October 2025, Mattathias Schwartz and Zach Montague of The New York Times surveyed 65 federal judges on, among other questions, whether they agreed with the following statement:

The Supreme Court has made appro­pri­ate use of the emergency docket since President Trump returned to office.

In this survey, we repeated this question for our expert samples, including federal judges and other legal experts. 

Majorities of federal judges surveyed by the Times and Bright Line Watch (72% and 65%, respec­tive­ly; not a sta­tis­ti­cal­ly sig­nif­i­cant dif­fer­ence) disagreed with the Supreme Court’s use of the emergency docket. Legal liberals are much more likely to disagree with recent usage of the emergency docket than legal con­ser­v­a­tives, though a sub­stan­tial minority of the latter also expressed doubts (88% vs. 35%). Political sci­en­tists align closely with legal experts overall (75% and 78%, respectively).

Politicization of justice

DOJ use for political ends

Drawing again from Emily Bazelon’s survey of legal experts in The New York Times, we asked respon­dents whether the Biden and Trump admin­is­tra­tions directed the DOJ to go after political and personal enemies and provide favors or benefits to the president’s political and personal allies. The results reveal a consensus on the current admin­is­tra­tion across legal expert subgroups and among political sci­en­tists as well as sharp partisan divisions in the public.

Overwhelming majori­ties of all legal expert subgroups — federal judges, elite lawyers, law pro­fes­sors (86%, 94%, 94%; no sig­nif­i­cant dif­fer­ences), legal con­ser­v­a­tives (75%), and legal liberals (99%) — say the Trump admin­is­tra­tion is going after political enemies to a sig­nif­i­cant or greater degree (93% of political sci­en­tists say the same). The pro­por­tions of legal experts indi­cat­ing the Trump admin­is­tra­tion provides favors or benefits to the president’s allies are similarly high among pro­fes­sions (86–97%; no sig­nif­i­cant dif­fer­ences); though the gap by ideology persists, there is still majority consensus (56% of legal con­ser­v­a­tives, 97% of liberals). 

Uniquely, legal con­ser­v­a­tives see no dif­fer­ence between the Biden and Trump admin­is­tra­tions in these regards. Many pre­vi­ous­ly condemned Biden com­ment­ing on DOJ inves­ti­ga­tions into Trump and crit­i­ciz­ing David Weiss, the special counsel appointed to inves­ti­gate Biden’s son Hunter. On the other hand, legal liberals and all legal pro­fes­sion­al subgroups are much less likely to say that Biden misused the DOJ to go after enemies and provide favors to allies (1–10% for both).

The pattern of sharp public polar­iza­tion on per­cep­tions of the Trump and Biden admin­is­tra­tion’s respect for the rule of law persists. Among Republicans, far more regard the Biden admin­is­tra­tion (68%) than the current Trump admin­is­tra­tion (17%) as having politi­cized pros­e­cu­tions. Among Democrats, these pro­por­tions are reversed and even more lopsided, with 86% holding that Trump’s Justice Department goes after political enemies and only 10% believing that Biden’s DOJ did so. Partisan inde­pen­dents (25% of the public sample) line up slightly closer to Democrats than Republicans on these questions, with 56% holding that the Trump admin­is­tra­tion politi­cizes pros­e­cu­tions and 30% believing Biden did.

The same partisan diver­gence appears in assess­ments of whether the Trump and Biden admin­is­tra­tions provided favors or benefits to the president’s allies. 68% of Republicans and 12% of Democrats say the Biden admin­is­tra­tion did, but they switch places on the Trump admin­is­tra­tion with 14% and 85%, respec­tive­ly. Independents are again slightly closer to Democrats, 36% saying Biden provided favors and 56% saying Trump does. 

Politically motivated prosecutions

We asked elite lawyers, law pro­fes­sors, and political sci­en­tists whether specific pros­e­cu­tions were polit­i­cal­ly motivated. (We did not ask federal judges given ethics concerns about com­ment­ing on current or potential future cases.)

The set of pros­e­cu­tions by era are as follows:

Biden era

• In 2023, the Justice Department indicted Hunter Biden for allegedly lying on his appli­ca­tion to purchase a handgun.

• In 2023, the Justice Department indicted former Congressman George Santos, a New York Republican, for allegedly com­mit­ting wire fraud, con­spir­a­cy, and identity theft.
• In 2023, Justice Department Special Counsel Jack Smith indicted Donald Trump for allegedly retaining clas­si­fied documents after leaving the pres­i­den­cy in 2021.
• In 2023, Justice Department Special Counsel Jack Smith indicted Donald Trump for allegedly par­tic­i­pat­ing in criminal con­spir­a­cies in his efforts to overturn the 2020 pres­i­den­tial election.

Trump era

• In 2025, the Justice Department indicted former FBI Director James Comey for allegedly lying to and obstruct­ing Congress related to the Russia inves­ti­ga­tion. (Note: That case was dismissed, but Comey was indicted by the Justice Department again in April 2026 on unrelated charges.)
• In 2025, the Justice Department indicted New York Attorney General Letitia James, a Democrat, for allegedly com­mit­ting mortgage fraud.
• In 2025, the Justice Department indicted Congresswoman Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick, a Florida Democrat, for allegedly stealing federal disaster funds and making illegal campaign contributions.

The figure below shows the share of our expert and public samples who indicated that the pros­e­cu­tion was or is motivated by politics. Because lawyers and law pro­fes­sors do not differ mea­sur­ably in their eval­u­a­tions of these cases, we aggregate them in the figure. Due to con­sis­tent­ly low sample sizes and resulting impre­ci­sion, we do not dis­ag­gre­gate legal liberals and legal con­ser­v­a­tives in the main text (figure dis­ag­gre­gat­ed by ideology in appendix). 

Legal experts and political sci­en­tists were most likely to rate the first pros­e­cu­tion of James Comey (95% from both) and Letitia James as motivated by politics (96% and 94%, respec­tive­ly). Legal expert and political scientist views split on Hunter Biden’s 2023 indict­ment for allegedly lying on his appli­ca­tion to purchase a handgun (61% of legal experts and 52% of political sci­en­tists perceive political motives) and the 2025 indict­ment of then-Congresswoman Cherfilus-McCormick (44% and 52%). 

Only a small minority of legal experts and political sci­en­tists view the 2023 Trump indict­ments as polit­i­cal­ly motivated (19% and 20%, respec­tive­ly, for the clas­si­fied documents case; 13% for the indict­ment for allegedly attempt­ing to overturn the 2020 election). Finally, almost no legal experts or political sci­en­tists view the 2023 George Santos indict­ment as polit­i­cal­ly motivated.

Close to half of the overall public say these pros­e­cu­tions were polit­i­cal­ly motivated with the exception of the Santos case (30%). Most notably, large majori­ties of Republicans say the Trump indict­ments were motivated by politics (81% for documents, 78% for 2020 election).

Presumption of regularity

The “pre­sump­tion of reg­u­lar­i­ty”—the doctrine that courts should presume federal gov­ern­ment officials act lawfully and in good faith absent clear evidence to the contrary—is a foun­da­tion­al principle of American law. Remarkably, a majority of legal experts now disagree with the view that the federal gov­ern­ment still merits the pre­sump­tion of reg­u­lar­i­ty in federal court. Only 41% of federal judges agree that the pre­sump­tion of reg­u­lar­i­ty is still merited. Endorsement is even lower among elite lawyers (24%) and law pro­fes­sors (17%). Legal con­ser­v­a­tives are the most likely to endorse the pre­sump­tion of reg­u­lar­i­ty, but still only 56% agree (compared to 14% among legal liberals). 

Compliance with court orders

The rule of law depends on the gov­ern­ment making accurate rep­re­sen­ta­tions in court and complying with court orders. We therefore asked legal experts to assess how often DOJ political appointees have misled federal judges and how often federal officials have failed to comply with court orders during the second Trump admin­is­tra­tion. We also asked how often these actions took place under Biden.

In total, 86% of legal experts say that DOJ political appointees in the Trump admin­is­tra­tion mislead federal judges somewhat or very often, and 80% say that federal officials in the Trump admin­is­tra­tion fail to comply with court orders somewhat or very often. These estimates cor­re­spond with recent estimates of more than 200 instances of court concerns over non­com­pli­ance with judicial orders, distrust of gov­ern­ment infor­ma­tion and rep­re­sen­ta­tions, and findings of “arbitrary and capri­cious” admin­is­tra­tive action. The results also align with more than 400 instances of failure to comply with federal court orders in immi­gra­tion habeas corpus pro­ceed­ings. Notably, legal expert estimates of mis­lead­ing judges and non-com­pli­ance for the second Trump admin­is­tra­tion are sharply elevated compared to perceived rates under Biden (86% vs. 6%, and 80% vs. 10%, respectively).

Across pro­fes­sions, the only sig­nif­i­cant dif­fer­ence is between elite lawyers and law pro­fes­sors on the frequency of DOJ political appointees mis­lead­ing federal judges under the current admin­is­tra­tion (95% vs. 79%). 

Differences are greater between legal con­ser­v­a­tives and legal liberals. Legal liberals are virtually unanimous in saying that Trump officials often mislead federal judges and defy court orders (91% and 86%, respec­tive­ly). Perceptions of these behaviors are lower among legal con­ser­v­a­tives but many still express sig­nif­i­cant concern — 50% say Trump DOJ appointees often mislead judges and 43% say federal officials often fail to comply with court orders. Both groups perceive these behaviors as happening at rel­a­tive­ly low rates under Biden (mis­lead­ing judges: 3% for legal liberals vs. 24% for legal con­ser­v­a­tives; court orders: 10% and 14%, respec­tive­ly), though the dif­fer­ences in perceived frequency between admin­is­tra­tions are only sta­tis­ti­cal­ly sig­nif­i­cant for legal liberals. 

Fear of reprisals among legal professionals

During the current admin­is­tra­tion, judges have repeat­ed­ly warned that they face personal attacks from politi­cians as well as direct threats of violence. According to the U.S. Marshals Service, the agency that protects judges and other legal officials, reported threats against federal judges have remained above 500 per year since 2023, reaching 564 in fiscal year 2025. A common method of harass­ment has been anonymous pizza deliv­er­ies to judges’ homes, often sent in the name of U.S. District Judge Esther Salas’s son, Daniel Anderl, who was murdered in 2020 by a man targeting his mother while posing as a delivery man. 

We therefore asked federal judges and other legal experts whether they are per­son­al­ly concerned about facing con­se­quences for taking an action against the second Trump admin­is­tra­tion. We also asked our sample of lawyers whether their firm or organization’s decisions were affected by fear of reprisals during the current admin­is­tra­tion and under Biden. The results reveal that sub­stan­tial minori­ties are concerned about facing targeted action for acting against the federal gov­ern­ment in their official and legal capacity and that these fears are affecting some hiring and rep­re­sen­ta­tion decisions by law firms and other organizations.

We specif­i­cal­ly asked legal experts whether they were concerned about the following con­se­quences if they ruled against the gov­ern­ment (judges), took a legal action against it (elite lawyers), or publicly argued against it (law professors):

• Social con­se­quences (for example, exclusion from social events)
• Harassment (online or in-person)
• Professional con­se­quences (for example, losing job or promotion)
• Legal sanctions (for example, pros­e­cu­tion or fine)
• Violence (the use of physical force to harm someone)

A sig­nif­i­cant pro­por­tion of all subgroups reported concern about harass­ment either online or in-person if they oppose the federal gov­ern­ment (32% for law pro­fes­sors, 45% for elite lawyers, 47% for judges). Concern about violence ranged from 7% among judges to 27% among elite lawyers. Elite lawyers were also most fre­quent­ly concerned about facing legal sanctions (31%) or pro­fes­sion­al con­se­quences (23%).

Soon after Trump’s second inau­gu­ra­tion, Trump signed several executive orders targeting some of the country’s largest law firms, including Paul Weiss and Perkins Coie. To avoid being targeted, other major law firms signed pre­emp­tive deals with the admin­is­tra­tion, promising extensive pro bono work for the president’s pri­or­i­ties. At the end of our survey period in early March 2026, the DOJ requested to drop its appeal against law firms who had chal­lenged the executive orders in court, but then reversed course the following day. 

Our survey asked lawyers about how fears of potential adverse action by the gov­ern­ment affected decisions by their firm or orga­ni­za­tion. Nearly one in five (18%) reported that rep­re­sen­ta­tion decisions by their firm were affected somewhat or very often by fear of adverse action by the federal gov­ern­ment during the Trump admin­is­tra­tion, sig­nif­i­cant­ly higher than the 2% who said the same about rep­re­sen­ta­tion decisions during the Biden admin­is­tra­tion. Findings are similar for hiring — 13% said fear of adverse actions affected hiring and personnel decisions by their firms somewhat or very often compared to 3% during the Biden admin­is­tra­tion. (We do not dis­ag­gre­gate expert responses by ideology because these questions measure lawyers’ self-reported experiences.)

Rule of law principles

We asked legal experts to evaluate nineteen rule of law prin­ci­ples on two dimen­sions: how essential each is to the rule of law, and how well the United States currently meets that standard. The full list of 37 prin­ci­ples asked of political sci­en­tists and the public appears in the appendix below. 

Federal judges were only asked to evaluate seven prin­ci­ples due to survey length con­straints. For the purposes of pre­sen­ta­tion, we organized the prin­ci­ples into three cat­e­gories: insti­tu­tion­al checks and balances, rule of law and anti-cor­rup­tion, and civil liberties and expression.

The figure below shows the per­cent­age of legal experts who indicated that the principle in question is essential to the rule of law and mostly or fully met in the U.S. The lower right region of the figure indicates the areas in which the rule of law is most acutely threat­ened – prin­ci­ples that most respon­dents see as essential to the rule of law but where few see the principle as being upheld. This set includes prin­ci­ples measuring con­sti­tu­tion­al limits on executive authority and ones con­cern­ing the impar­tial­i­ty of gov­ern­ment agencies and law enforcement.

In the figures below, we display the share of legal experts who indicate that a principle is  essential to the rule of law on the left, and the share who say the standard is mostly or fully met in the U.S. today on the right. These are presented sep­a­rate­ly for each category of prin­ci­ples: insti­tu­tion­al checks and balances, rule of law and anti-cor­rup­tion, and civil liberties and expres­sion. Individual points are only shown when we observe sta­tis­ti­cal dif­fer­ences between pro­fes­sion­al or ide­o­log­i­cal subgroups after applying a false discovery rate cor­rec­tion. We otherwise only show a pooled point. 

Institutional checks & balances

• Executive authority cannot be expanded beyond con­sti­tu­tion­al limits
• The leg­is­la­ture is able to effec­tive­ly limit executive power
• The judiciary is able to effec­tive­ly limit executive power
• Lower courts are able to effec­tive­ly limit executive power
• The Supreme Court is able to effec­tive­ly limit executive power
• The elected branches respect judicial independence

Legal experts identify con­straints on executive power as the most essential prin­ci­ples to the rule of law: 84% for con­sti­tu­tion­al limits on executive authority, 74% for the judiciary’s ability to limit the executive, and 73% for the elected branches respect­ing judicial inde­pen­dence. Majorities also view the ability of the Supreme Court (68%) and leg­is­la­ture (62%) to check executive power as essential, whereas just 42% place a similar priority on lower courts as a check on executive authority.

Legal pro­fes­sion­als diverge on two of these prin­ci­ples. Federal judges are less likely to rate the judi­cia­ry’s ability to limit the executive branch as essential to the rule of law (61%) than are elite lawyers (85%). Elite lawyers are also more likely to rate the Supreme Court’s ability to limit the executive branch as essential than are law pro­fes­sors (80% vs. 59%, respec­tive­ly; we did not ask federal judges to evaluate this principle due to space limitations).

Legal con­ser­v­a­tives and liberals do not differ mea­sur­ably in the areas where pro­fes­sion­al subgroups do. They instead differ on the impor­tance of elected branches respect­ing judicial inde­pen­dence (rated essential by 44% of legal con­ser­v­a­tives versus 83% of liberals), and whether lower courts are able to effec­tive­ly limit the executive (0% and 53%, respectively). 

We also asked whether these standards are being met in the United States today. Legal experts are least likely to say that the leg­is­la­ture can limit the executive (12% say the standard is met) and that executive authority is not expanded beyond con­sti­tu­tion­al limits (19%). Few stated that standards were being upheld for respect­ing judicial inde­pen­dence (27%) and for limits on the executive by the Supreme Court (30%), lower courts (34%), and the judiciary as a whole (33%). There is broad agreement in these assess­ments across pro­fes­sion­al subgroups.

However, legal con­ser­v­a­tives and liberals diverge sharply in their assess­ments of whether some of these prin­ci­ples are upheld. Legal con­ser­v­a­tives are far more likely than are legal liberals to say that the Constitution limits executive authority (75% and 7%, respec­tive­ly), that elected branches respect judicial inde­pen­dence (80% and 19%, respec­tive­ly), and that the Supreme Court is able to limit executive power (70% and 22%, respec­tive­ly). The ratings they give otherwise do not differ measurably.

Rule of law and anti-corruption

• Government officials are legally sanc­tioned for misconduct
• Government officials do not use public office for private gain
• Government agencies are not used to monitor, attack, or punish political opponents
• Government effec­tive­ly prevents private actors from engaging in polit­i­cal­ly-motivated violence or intimidation
• Law enforce­ment inves­ti­ga­tions of public officials or their asso­ciates are free from political influence or interference
• The law is enforced equally for all persons
• Officeholders do not use law enforce­ment to advance political agendas or intim­i­date political opponents
• Law enforce­ment remains polit­i­cal­ly neutral and does not favor or support any political party or candidate

Among anti-cor­rup­tion prin­ci­ples, legal experts are most likely to rate the following as essential: that agencies not be used to punish political opponents, that law enforce­ment not be exploited for political ends and remain polit­i­cal­ly neutral, that the law apply equally to all citizens, that inves­ti­ga­tions of public officials be free from political inter­fer­ence, and that officials face sanctions for mis­con­duct. Each is rated essential by 69–81% of respon­dents. Lesser majori­ties place the same priority on the gov­ern­ment pre­vent­ing political violence and on officials not using public office for private gain (58% and 56%, respectively).

Elite lawyers are more likely than law pro­fes­sors to say that law enforce­ment not being exploited for political reasons is essential (91% vs. 72%). Federal judges are also more likely than law pro­fes­sors to say that the law enforced equally for all persons is essential (90% vs. 67%). Legal pro­fes­sions do not differ mea­sur­ably on the impor­tance of the remaining principles.

When asked whether these standards are met in the U.S. today, legal experts express negative views. For instance, only 36% of legal experts say the standard of gov­ern­ment pre­vent­ing political violence is met. Even fewer have faith that law enforce­ment is polit­i­cal­ly neutral and not exploited for political purposes, that agencies are not punishing political opponents, that the law applies equally, that inves­ti­ga­tions of political opponents are not com­pro­mised, and that there are sanctions for gov­ern­ment officials who commit mis­con­duct (11–25%). Only 5% of legal experts are confident that gov­ern­ment officials do not use public office for private gain. The only dif­fer­ence between pro­fes­sion­al subgroups that we observe in these ratings is that federal judges are more likely to indicate that the standard of political neu­tral­i­ty for law enforce­ment is being met compared to law pro­fes­sors (55% vs. 13%).

Notably, legal liberals and con­ser­v­a­tives do not mea­sur­ably disagree on the impor­tance of these prin­ci­ples to the rule of law or on whether these prin­ci­ples are being upheld with one exception — legal con­ser­v­a­tives are far more likely to say that the principle that the law applies equally is being upheld in practice (50%) than are legal liberals (7%).

Civil liberties & expression

• Government does not interfere with jour­nal­ists or news organizations
• Government protects indi­vid­u­als’ right to engage in unpopular speech or expression
• Government protects indi­vid­u­als’ right to engage in peaceful protest
• Universities, busi­ness­es, and pro­fes­sion­al orga­ni­za­tions operate inde­pen­dent­ly of gov­ern­ment pressure
• All adult citizens enjoy the same legal and political rights

Legal experts place the highest priority on the gov­ern­ment pro­tect­ing the right to protest and to free speech, pre­serv­ing equal political and legal rights, and not inter­fer­ing with the press — 69–74% rate these prin­ci­ples as essential to the rule of law. They place somewhat less priority on uni­ver­si­ties, busi­ness­es, and pro­fes­sion­al orga­ni­za­tions operating inde­pen­dent­ly of gov­ern­ment pressure, which 48% rate as essential. 

In practice, about a third of legal experts are confident that the gov­ern­ment is currently pro­tect­ing rights to protest and freedom of expres­sion and is guar­an­tee­ing equal political and legal rights. Even fewer think that the gov­ern­ment does not interfere with the press or inde­pen­dent orga­ni­za­tions, with 13% and 8%, respec­tive­ly, saying these standards are met. We only observe dif­fer­ences between elite lawyers and law pro­fes­sors on whether free speech is essential to the rule of law, the former rating higher than the latter. 

Legal con­ser­v­a­tives are sub­stan­tial­ly less likely than liberals to regard free speech pro­tec­tion (18% vs. 76%) and equal political and legal rights (26% vs. 78%) as essential to the rule of law. We find no sta­tis­ti­cal dif­fer­ences between these subgroups in assess­ment of current U.S. per­for­mance on these principles.

Confidence in institutions

We asked legal experts and political sci­en­tists about their con­fi­dence in a range of U.S. insti­tu­tions using wording drawn from the Marquette Law School Poll. (Survey responses from the public are provided in the appendix.) 

Legal experts and political sci­en­tists were the most likely to express con­fi­dence in federal district and circuit courts (77% and 63%, respec­tive­ly) and the Federal Reserve (72% and 71%), with no dif­fer­ences among legal experts by pro­fes­sion or ideology. Confidence was lower and more polarized for other insti­tu­tions measured, however. 

The gap in trust between experts is most sig­nif­i­cant on the Supreme Court; most legal con­ser­v­a­tives express con­fi­dence in the Court (85%) but very few political sci­en­tists and legal liberals do so (13% and 12%, respec­tive­ly). Similarly, lawyers and judges are more likely to express con­fi­dence in the Court than law pro­fes­sors (33%, 35%, 9%). Legal con­ser­v­a­tives also express more con­fi­dence than legal liberals and political sci­en­tists in the FBI (47% versus 8% and 8%, respec­tive­ly), Customs and Border Protection (63%, 0%, 7%), and the Department of Justice (43%, 1%, 3%). Confidence is much lower among legal con­ser­v­a­tives and neg­li­gi­ble for legal liberals and political sci­en­tists for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (33%, 0%, 3%), the pres­i­den­cy (23%, 0%, 1%), and espe­cial­ly Congress, an insti­tu­tion in which not a single legal expert surveyed indicated con­fi­dence (3% of political scientists).

Experts trust a very different set of insti­tu­tions than the public — they are skeptical in every insti­tu­tion except for the Federal Reserve and federal lower courts. Specifically, legal experts and political sci­en­tists express far less con­fi­dence in the pres­i­den­cy, Congress, and the surveyed federal enforce­ment agencies (FBI, CBP, DOJ, and ICE) than the public, but much more con­fi­dence in lower courts and the Federal Reserve.

Legal experts overall are less confident than both Democrats and Republicans in Congress, DOJ, and the pres­i­den­cy. The contrast between legal experts and Republicans is sharper, where legal experts are much more skeptical of ICE, CBP, the FBI, and the Supreme Court.

Comparing legal experts by ideology with public partisans, Republicans are closer to legal con­ser­v­a­tives than to legal liberals and do not differ sig­nif­i­cant­ly from legal con­ser­v­a­tives on CBP, DOJ, or the FBI. Legal con­ser­v­a­tives are nonethe­less less confident than Republicans in the pres­i­den­cy, ICE, and Congress. Legal liberals, by contrast, are less confident than Democrats in the DOJ, Congress, CBP, the pres­i­den­cy, ICE, and the FBI.

Events threatening and benefiting the rule of law

We asked legal experts to evaluate the effect of a set of thirty events from the past on the rule of law (due to sample size lim­i­ta­tions, we asked judges to evaluate only five). In previous surveys, we asked political sci­en­tists to evaluate the threat to democracy of actions taken by or during the Biden admin­is­tra­tion, including the threat posed by Biden pardoning Hunter Biden, other Biden family members, and other targets like Anthony Fauci (47%, 44%, 23% said threat, respec­tive­ly). Due to survey length lim­i­ta­tions, we mostly con­strained the list to events that occurred during Trump’s second term, or to events from previous years that we deemed espe­cial­ly relevant to the administration’s actions today. Legal pro­fes­sion­als were first asked whether the event would benefit, threaten, or not affect the rule of law in America. Those who said it would benefit or threaten the rule of law were then asked about the extent of such an effect. The set of events that experts rated was the following:

Full list of events

• The Colorado state Supreme Court rules that the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution prohibits Trump from appearing on Colorado ballots because of his actions on January 6, 2021.
• The U.S. Supreme Court overturns the Colorado decision that bars Donald Trump from appearing on the ballot.
• The Supreme Court rules that the president has “absolute immunity from criminal pros­e­cu­tion for actions within his con­clu­sive and preclu­sive con­sti­tu­tion­al authority” and “at least pre­sump­tive immunity from pros­e­cu­tion” for all official acts.
• Joe Biden grants a “full and uncon­di­tion­al” pardon of his son Hunter Biden, absolving him of existing federal charges and shielding him from future pros­e­cu­tion for federal crimes.
• Joe Biden grants a pre­emp­tive pardon to five members of his family besides Hunter Biden, shielding them from future pros­e­cu­tion for federal crimes.
• Donald Trump issues an executive order seeking to deny cit­i­zen­ship to people born in the U.S. whose parents are not lawful permanent residents.
• Donald Trump pardons nearly all indi­vid­u­als charged in con­nec­tion with the Jan. 6 Capitol attack, including violent offenders.
• The Trump admin­is­tra­tion fires Department of Justice officials who worked on criminal inves­ti­ga­tions of Trump’s actions as president.
• The Trump admin­is­tra­tion issues executive orders that impose penalties on some major law firms.
• FBI Director Kash Patel shuts down the FBI’s public cor­rup­tion inves­ti­ga­tion unit and fires agents who worked on inves­ti­ga­tions related to Trump.
• Donald Trump writes on Truth Social that a federal judge who ruled against him “should be IMPEACHED!!!”
• The Supreme Court holds that federal courts cannot issue universal or nation­wide injunctions.
• President Trump tries to fire Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook after his admin­is­tra­tion accuses her of mortgage fraud.
• Trump directs Attorney General Pam Bondi to prosecute his political enemies in a Truth Social message.
• Trump pardons his former attorney and chief of staff as well as nearly 80 other allies accused of plotting to overturn the 2020 election.
• Six Democratic lawmakers with military or intel­li­gence back­grounds issue a video stating that military personnel should not obey unlawful orders.
• Trump accuses Democratic lawmakers of “seditious behavior, pun­ish­able by death” for releasing a video stating that military personnel should not obey unlawful orders.
• Trump pardons [Juan] Orlando Hernandez, the former president of Honduras, who was serving 45 years in prison for helping drug traf­fick­ers import cocaine to the U.S. (first name omitted in survey wording)
• Federal judges rule that Lindsey Halligan and Alina Habba were unlaw­ful­ly appointed as U.S. Attorneys.
• Federal agents fatally shoot Renee Good during immi­gra­tion oper­a­tions in Minnesota.
• The Department of Justice begins a criminal inves­ti­ga­tion into Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell.
• Federal agents fatally shoot Alex Pretti during immi­gra­tion oper­a­tions in Minnesota.
• ICE disobeys 96 court orders in the District of Minnesota in January, according to Chief U.S. District Judge Patrick J. Schiltz.
• FBI agents search a Fulton County, Georgia election center for ballots from the 2020 election with the Director of National Intelligence present.
• The jour­nal­ist Don Lemon is charged with federal civil rights crimes after live-streaming a protest at a church in St. Paul, Minnesota.
• U.S. attorneys’ offices ask job appli­cants to explain how they would advance President Trump’s policy priorities.
• The Department of Homeland Security sends admin­is­tra­tive subpoenas to tech companies request­ing personal infor­ma­tion about users whose social media accounts track or criticize the agency.
• The Supreme Court rules that President Trump exceeded his authority to impose tariffs under existing law, inval­i­dat­ing many of the tariffs he imposed on foreign goods.
• After the U.S. Supreme Court strikes down his previous tariff program, President Trump says “I am ashamed of certain Members of the Court” and says “[i]t is my opinion that the Court has been swayed by Foreign Interests.”
• After the U.S. Supreme Court strikes down his previous tariff program, President Trump imposes a new temporary tariff of 15% on imports.
  

Many of the events we asked about were rated by most legal experts as either serious or extra­or­di­nary threats to the rule of law, including many related to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). For instance, 90% of experts said the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sending admin­is­tra­tive subpoenas to tech companies seeking user data for social media accounts that criticize ICE is an extra­or­di­nary or serious threat to the rule of law. Another event, deemed a serious or extra­or­di­nary threat to the rule of law by 93% of respon­dents, was ICE’s dis­obe­di­ence of at least 96 court orders in the District of Minnesota. The chief federal judge in Minnesota, Judge Patrick J. Schiltz, compiled the list of defied orders, which he wrote was more than “some federal agencies have violated in their entire existence.” 

Legal experts also shared alarm (with 93% per­ceiv­ing a serious or extra­or­di­nary threat to the rule of law) about Trump pardoning nearly all indi­vid­u­als, including violent offenders, charged in con­nec­tion with the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol. When Bright Line Watch asked political sci­en­tists about the pardons in February 2025, they similarly rated them as among the greatest threats to democracy (83% said extra­or­di­nary or serious).

Actions that weaken sanctions for mis­con­duct by gov­ern­ment officials were also rated as serious threats to the rule of law by legal experts. Examples include FBI Director Kash Patel’s order to shut down the agency’s public cor­rup­tion unit (98% overall; 84% serious or extra­or­di­nary) and Trump firing DOJ officials who inves­ti­gat­ed him (93% overall; 83% serious or extraordinary).

Overall, the events we asked about were widely con­sid­ered threats to the rule of law and assess­ments did not mean­ing­ful­ly vary by pro­fes­sion or ideology. However, legal experts agreed that the Supreme Court ruling against Trump in the recent tariff case was an extra­or­di­nary or serious benefit to the rule of law (65%). The case was a sig­nif­i­cant defeat for one of the administration’s top pri­or­i­ties, prompting Trump to say that he was “ashamed of certain Members of the Court.”

Appendix

This report was designed, written, and analyzed with the assis­tance of Jack Haubold (Dartmouth College class of 2027). 

Sample information

Sample	Response rate	Respondents who answered at least one non-consent question	Total invited
Article III federal judges	1.5%	21	1435
Elite lawyers	1.7%	113	6466
Law pro­fes­sors	4.5%	193	4253
Political sci­en­tists	7.5%	652	8718

Elite lawyers were recruited from mem­ber­ship and lead­er­ship lists drawn from the American Law Institute, the National Association of Former United States Attorneys, the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, American Bar Association gov­er­nance and lead­er­ship bodies, state attorneys general, and heads of appellate or Supreme Court practice at Am Law 100 firms (though none responded from this final group). The table below indicates the pro­por­tions of the respond­ing elite lawyer sample that were sampled from each source.

Source	Number of respondents	% of respond­ing sample
ABA Sections, Divisions, and Forums	41	36%
American Law Institute	21	19%
ABA House of Delegates	15	13%
ABA Special Committees and Commissions	10	9%
American Academy of Appellate Lawyers	9	8%
ABA Standing Committees	7	6%
National Association of Former United States Attorneys	5	4%
ABA Board of Governors	2	2%
U.S. faculty at top uni­ver­si­ties (indi­vid­u­als from this list who primarily iden­ti­fied as a lawyer over law professor)	2	2%
List of state attorneys general	1	1%

All law pro­fes­sors’ emails in our sample were collected from faculty pages at uni­ver­si­ties with law schools ranked under U.S. News top 50 law schools (2025). Article III federal judge emails were collected or inferred for all Article III federal judges.

Statistical methods

For binary-threshold outcomes, we converted responses to binary indi­ca­tors using pre-defined thresh­olds and estimated sample and subgroup com­par­isons with logistic regres­sion models fit using survey::svyglm(). For con­tin­u­ous outcomes, we used survey-weighted linear regres­sion models, also fit with survey::svyglm(). In both cases, we reported predicted prob­a­bil­i­ties or means, pairwise dif­fer­ences, 95% con­fi­dence intervals, and p‑values.

Public estimates used survey weights. Expert com­par­isons used the same modeling framework with equal weights across expert respon­dents. For com­par­isons across samples and subgroups, we applied a false discovery rate (FDR) adjust­ment within the rule-of-law per­for­mance battery, the rule-of-law impor­tance battery, and the threats/benefits battery for recent events.

For cat­e­gor­i­cal items with sub­stan­tive­ly distinct response groupings, such as responses indi­cat­ing greater versus lesser threat, we defined separate binary indi­ca­tors for each grouping and estimated subgroup dif­fer­ences for each indicator.

Supplementary figures

Law pro­fes­sors reporting con­se­quences after opposing Biden or Trump administrations

We also asked members of the public whether they believe certain con­se­quences are justified if a legal pro­fes­sion­al publicly opposes either the Biden or Trump admin­is­tra­tion. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to view adverse con­se­quences as justified if a pro­fes­sion­al publicly opposes the Trump admin­is­tra­tion, a pattern largely con­sis­tent with their overall partisan evaluations. 

Legal expert eval­u­a­tions (0–100) of hypo­thet­i­cal rule of law systems compared with political sci­en­tists of hypo­thet­i­cal democracies.

Beliefs that pros­e­cu­tions of political figures are motivated by politics, split by legal ideology.

Public approval of recent events

Political scientist ratings of the threat to democracy, and legal experts threat to rule of law, of 29 recent and events

Figures comparing political scientist and legal expert per­cep­tions of impor­tance and per­for­mance of rule of law principles