Thinking About the Unthinkable:

Prospects for Democratic Backsliding in the United States[1]

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Most Americans would probably be surprised to learn that experts on the comparative politics of democratization see any reason for concern about democratic breakdown in the United States. Not even many students of American politics have ever seriously considered threats to the durability of our democratic institutions. Instead, the Constitution is often criticized as excessively rigid,[2] functionally unamendable,[3] or as a "relic" persisting beyond its usefulness.[4] Since the late 19th century, most Americans have complacently regarded the U.S. political system as a "machine that would go of itself."[5]

Taking a global view, however, scholars of democratization know that democratic institutions cannot be taken for granted.[6] Democracies can deteriorate, even when they are not overthrown by coup or corrupted by ballot-box fraud. What are the prospects for democratic backsliding in the contemporary U.S.? Given how extensively the American constitutional system fragments political power, Americanists have tended to worry much more about gridlock and ungovernability than authoritarianism.[7]

Rather than a slide toward autocracy, threats to American democracy are more likely to entail erosion of the norms of a racially and ethnically inclusive liberalism rather than a concentration of executive power. A more populist politics—especially in a party system increasingly defined along lines of race and identity—would menace the rights and interests of minorities and immigrants. But short of minority disfranchisement or exclusion, populism does not necessarily undermine formal democratic institutions and processes. American politics might become less inclusive and tolerant, without loss of democratic form. Threats to American democracy center more on the performance of its democratic institutions rather than on their persistence.

Bermeo identifies three varieties of democratic "backsliding" that have emerged as common pathways to democratic breakdown since the end of the Cold War: promissory coup, executive aggrandizement, and strategic election manipulation.[8] A promissory coup—meaning an ouster of an elected government that is framed as a defense of the democratic order—is highly unlikely in the United States. Firm and longstanding civilian control of the military closes off the usual pathway to a promissory coup, though there has been a remarkable amount of media speculation about a "25th Amendment solution" to the Trump presidency.[9] The more serious

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[2] Daniel Lazare, *The Frozen Republic: How the Constitution Is Paralyzing Democracy* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1997).
[3] Sanford Levinson, *Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We the People Can Correct It* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
[4] William G. Howell and Terry M. Moe, *Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines Effective Government--and Why We Need a More Powerful Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 2016).
[5] Michael Kammen, *A Machine That Would Go Of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987).
[6] Larry Diamond, "Facing Up to the Democratic Recession," *Journal of Democracy* 26 (2015): 141-155.
[7] See, for example, Sarah A. Binder, *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003) and Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, *It's Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism* (New York: Basic Books, 2016).
[8] Nancy Bermeo, "On Democratic Backsliding" *Journal of Democracy* 27 (January 2016): 5-18.
[9] Ross Douthat, "The 25th Amendment Solution for Removing Trump" *New York Times*, May 16, 2017. See also David Faris, "Could the 25th Amendment Really Remove Trump from Office?" *The Week*, August 17, 2017.

questions about possible democratic backsliding in the United States focus instead on executive aggrandizement and strategic election manipulation.

Executive Aggrandizement

Executive aggrandizement "occurs when elected executives weaken checks on executive power one by one, undertaking a series of institutional changes that hamper the power of opposition forces to challenge executive preferences."[10] Recent cases of democratic backsliding down this path include Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ecuador under Rafael Correa, Russia under Vladimir Putin, and Hungary under Victor Orban.

There is no question that the U.S. presidency has grown in power, along with the rise of the administrative and national security state. Presidential authority over domestic regulation and foreign affairs is vast and its boundaries are ambiguous.[11] The party polarization of recent years has also amplified presidential power in some respects. Congresses mired in partisan gridlock are less able to assert themselves legislatively, allowing presidents to make more use of their unilateral powers, such as executive orders and signing statements.[12] Recent presidents have also been able to centralize power by staffing the executive branch with nominees screened for ideological conformity,[13] rather than the technocrats, representatives of clientele groups, and personal allies favored by presidents during the less polarized 20th century.[14]

But just as the U.S. presidency has grown in power, so too has the power of the president's opponents. Party polarization means that presidents confront a more tightly organized opposition party in Congress and throughout the federal system. Given that the bicameral Congress is not a majority-rule institution, strong party opposition is often sufficient to block a president's major legislative initiatives, even under unified government.[15] Moreover, U.S. national government has been under divided party control three-quarters of the time since 1980. Given the intensity of partisan conflict in Congress, recent presidents have experienced escalating difficulty confirming their nominees to the judiciary and executive branch.[16] There is

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Section 4 of the 25th Amendment specifies a process by which a vice president and a majority of a president's cabinet can declare a president "unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office."

[10] Bermeo, 11.

[11] Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, *The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

[12] William G. Howell, *Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

[13] David E. Lewis, *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Richard M. Skinner, "The Partisan Presidency," in *The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties*, John C. Green and Daniel J. Coffey, eds. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 331-342.

[14] Sidney M. Milkis, *The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System Since the New Deal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) and Nelson W. Polsby, "Presidential Cabinet Making: Lessons for the Political System," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (1978): 15-25

[15] David R. Mayhew, *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-2002*, 2nd ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).

[16] Sarah A. Binder and Forrest Maltzman, *Advice & Dissent: The Struggle to Shape the Federal Judiciary*. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009); Nolan McCarty and Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent:

no evidence that presidents in the polarized era are any better at getting Congress to enact their major initiatives.[17] Despite the strengthening of the presidency, contemporary presidents seem no better able than their predecessors to shape national policy outcomes to their liking.

The federal system also usually operates so that presidents face a substantial number of states controlled by their party opposition. Considering the degree of federal-state cooperation required in most federal policy implementation, opposed state governments have numerous tools to block or dilute national policies. Likewise, presidents regularly find their laws and executive actions bogged down in judicial disputes or overturned by the federal courts.

Skowronek characterizes contemporary presidents as facing a "political universe which is in every way more fully organized and densely inhabited."[18] In a thicker institutional environment, even as presidents have become more powerful, they are also more powerfully checked by opposing institutions, parties, and organized interests.

There is little prospect for major institutional reforms to strengthen the American presidency. Americans have long been notoriously conservative about their political institutions.[19] In countries where executive aggrandizement has occurred, it has often proceeded via democratic means—though national elections, referenda, and legitimate lawmaking processes. Correa, for example, "changed the institutions of democracy in basic ways, but always with an electoral mandate that averaged almost 56 percent across three elections spanning 2006 to 2013."[20] It is hard to imagine a president of the United States garnering the kind of broad support that would be required to win endorsement of major institutional changes to the system. The procedural barriers to constitutional change in the U.S. are extraordinarily high.[21] Even short of constitutional amendment, congressional enactment of major reforms of institutional powers and procedures would almost certainly also require a supermajority coalition. Presidents can rarely command this level of support. Presidents usually win office by slim margins of victory, especially in recent years. There has not been a landslide presidential election in American politics since 1984, when Ronald Reagan won a national majority of 58.8 percent. Two recent presidents (Donald J. Trump and George W. Bush) were installed without winning popular vote majorities. For the past decade, presidents have spent much of their terms near or below 50% approval in public opinion polls.

The difficulties of consolidating national power in U.S. politics have been on clear display since the 2016 elections. Despite unified party control of national institutions, including a conservative-majority Supreme Court, President Trump has been impeded at every turn. His most ambitious legislative drive, the effort to repeal and replace Obamacare, has thus far failed

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Senate Responses to Executive Branch nominations, 1885- 1996. American Journal of Political Science 43(1999): 1122-43.

[17] David R. Mayhew, *Partisan Balance: The Presidency, the Senate, and the House* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 42-47.

[18] Stephen Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 31.

[19] Robert A. Dahl, *How Democratic is the American Constitution?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 121-2.

[20] Bermeo, 12.

[21] Donald S. Lutz, "Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment," American Political Science Review 88 (2, 1994): 355-70.

in Congress. Nine months into his term of office, no major legislation has been enacted. A large share of executive branch offices remain unfilled, many due to Democratic obstruction, despite Republican majority control of the Senate.[22] Federal courts blocked the implementation of Trump's January 2017 executive order banning travel to the United States from seven majority-Muslim countries, in the midst of protests at airports nationwide. A second, scaled-back executive order issued in March 2017 also faced numerous legal challenges, as well as delays and restrictions imposed by the Courts. Although it appeared initially that the Republican-controlled Congress might prevent any serious investigation into the Russian intervention in the 2016 election, the Senate Intelligence Committee's investigation has been handled on a bipartisan basis. The appointment of Special Counsel Robert Mueller clearly indicates that unified party control of Congress has failed to shield Trump and his campaign team from political and legal exposure. Trump's climate and immigration policies face numerous obstacles in states and cities around the country. Barring unforeseen events, Trump's political capital will decline over time. [23] Republicans' nearly certain loss of seats in the 2018 midterm elections will further reduce the president's leverage.

Strategic Election Manipulation:

A second form of democratic backsliding, strategic election manipulation "denotes a range of actions aimed at tilting the electoral playing field in favor of incumbents. These include hampering media access, using government funds for incumbent campaigns, keeping opposition candidates off the ballot, hampering voter registration, packing electoral commissions, changing electoral rules to favor incumbents and harassing opponents."[24]

United States electoral law and procedures are hardly free of efforts at deck-stacking.[25] The political interests of incumbents and majority parties unquestionably influence policies regarding voting,[26] ballot access,[27] campaign finance,[28] legislative districting,[29] and government

[22] Carl Hulse, "Democrats Perfect Art of Delay While Republicans Fume Over Trump Nominees," *New York Times*, July 17, 2017.
[23] Paul Light, *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choices from Kennedy to Clinton* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
[24] Bermeo, 13.
[25] Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan & Richard H. Pildes, *The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process*, 4th ed (New York: Foundation Press, 2012).
[26] William D. Hicks, Seth C. McKee, Mitchell D. Sellers and Daniel A. Smith, "A Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and Partisan Competition in the American States," *Political Research Quarterly* 68 (2016): 18-33.
[27] Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Peverill Squire. "The Politics of Institutional Choice: Presidential Ballot Access for Third Parties in the United States." *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (1995): 419-27.
[28] David B. Magleby and Candice J. Nelson, *The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990): Raymond J. LaRaja, *Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008).
[29] Gary W. Cox and Jonathan N. Katz, *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

ethics.[30] Institutional engineering of this type may not always work as intended,[31] but it is certainly a feature of American politics.

Strategic election manipulation poses a reduced threat to American democracy at the federal level, however, because national power over elections is so limited. Voting procedures and voter registration, legislative districting, and ballot access are all almost entirely regulated and managed at the state and local levels. Even in the wake of the serious election administration problems revealed by the disputed 2000 presidential election, Congress's response was just a grant-in-aid program designed to help states and localities improve their own election procedures, rather than any effort to federalize election administration.[32]

The limits on federal power put firm bounds on political deck-staking. Even a party with unified control of the national government cannot impose nationwide rules tilting the overall playing field to its advantage. In states where one party is dominant, the majority party may adopt rules that are favorable to its interests, but party strength varies considerably across states. States that had recently switched to unified Republican party control were those most likely to adopt restrictive voter identification laws, for example, and this tendency was greater in states with more racial and ethnic diversity.[33] The effect of such laws on aggregate voter turnout appears to be "minimal,"[34] but where such laws were enacted, the differences between minority and white turnout increased.[35] Even so, the states that adopted strict voter identification rules were also states that already tended to elect Republican candidates in presidential and congressional elections even before the adoption of those rules.[36] In other words, parties can use this kind of deck-stacking in states where they are already strong, but they will have difficulty doing so in swing states or states that lean toward the opposing party. On some occasions, of course, a party may well take advantage of a temporary majority to entrench itself, along the lines of the Wisconsin Republican party's post-2010 gerrymanders and weakening of public sector unions. But the state-by-state nature of these institutional battles limits opportunities for a national party to insulate itself from electoral tides. The decentralization of power over election rules frustrates efforts at strategic election manipulation at the federal level.

Populism

The Madisonian system is more vulnerable to populism than to authoritarianism, because populism has great appeal to Americans. As Madison himself wrote: "Public opinion sets bounds

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[30] Dennis F. Thompson, *Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional Corruption* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).

[31] See, for example, Andrew Gelman and Gary King. "Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting," *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994): 541-59.

[32] Help America Vote Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107-252).

[33] Daniel R. Biggers and Michael J. Hanmer, "Understanding the Adoption of Voter Identification Laws in the American States," *American Politics Research* 45 (2017): 560-588.

[34] Benjamin Highton, "Voter Identification Laws and Turnout in the United States," *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017): 149-67.

[35] Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi, and Lindsay Nielson, "Voter Identification Laws and the Suppression of Minority Votes," *Journal of Politics* 79 (2017): 363-79.

[36] The states with strict voter identification rules are: Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Texas, and Wisconsin.

to every government, and is the real sovereign in every free one."[37] Grzymala-Busse defines populism as: "an anti-elite movement that expresses the general will of an organic and wholesome 'people.'"[38] Populist conceptions of the general will usually envision the "exclusion of some groups" and "majority rule without minority rights."[39] As such, populism—whether of the left or the right—tends to undermine liberalism.

Scholars of American public opinion have long known that the values undergirding liberal democracy are fragile at the grass-roots. McClosky concludes his 1964 study by noting that, "the findings furnish little comfort for those who wish to believe that a passion for freedom, tolerance, justice, and other democratic values springs spontaneously from the lower depths of the society."[40] Such a conclusion is borne out in numerous ways. The American mass electorate demonstrates only weak understanding of and adherence to basic democratic values.[41] Americans are often unwilling to apply the abstract civil libertarian principles they espouse to specific unpopular or threatening groups.[42] Authoritarian[43] and ethnocentric[44] beliefs are major drivers of public opinion on a wide array of political issues.

Long before the anti-establishment fervor of the 2016 elections, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse documented the extent to which Americans embrace populist notions of an organic and wholesome "people" in contradistinction to an out-of-touch political elite. Focus group participants in their studies repeatedly fell into talking about the wishes of "the people" or "the American people" as if there were a single public mind.[45] In the polling data they report, majorities express disdain of a "Washington system" of special interests, little understanding of the sources of disagreement in Congress, and impatience with debate and deliberation.[46] Frustrated with the contentiousness of real-world democracy, "surprising percentages of people respond favorably to the mention of decision-making structures that are not democratic," such as turning government over to "successful business-people."[47]

Americans' longstanding openness to populism becomes more troubling for liberal democracy during a time when the party system is becoming increasingly racialized. Even as early as 1989, Huckfeldt and Kohfield wrote a book about how race was driving out class as "the

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[37] *The Papers of James Madison*, William T. Hutchinson et al, eds. *The Founders' Constitution*, Volume 1, Chapter 2, Document 26 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962—77).
[38] Anna Grzymala-Busse, "Global Populisms and Their Impact," *Slavic Review* 76 (2017): S1-S8, S1.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review* 58 (1964): 375.
[41] James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics* 22 (1960, 2):276-94.
[42] John L. Sullivan, James Piereson, George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
[43] Marc J. Hetherington and Jonathan D. Weiler, *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
[44] Donald R. Kinder and Cindy D. Kam, *Us against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
[45] John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, *Congress and Public Enemy: Public Attitudes Toward American Political Institutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
[46] Ibid.
[47] John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs About How Government Should Work* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 138.

most significant factor in electoral politics."[48] Since 1989, the American electorate has become more racially and ethnically diverse, and the "diversity gap" between the parties has grown progressively wider. A Pew Research Center report on the 2016 party system concluded that the Democratic party "is becoming less white . . . at a faster rate than the country as a whole . . . while Republican voters are becoming more diverse . . . at a slower rate than the country generally."[49] Not only do the parties differ in terms of racial demographics, but white voters' attitudes toward race have become a much stronger predictor of their partisan attachments, with white racial conservatives more likely to identify as Republicans and white racial liberals more likely to identify as Democrats.[50] These racial differences between the parties are starkly reflected in Congress, where minorities make up 39 percent of Democratic members but only 5.5 percent of Republican members.[51]

A racialized party system in an electorate with questionable commitment to liberal values is a troubling development for American democracy. It is not easy to manage racial tensions in a democracy in any case, much less when race becomes a principal line of political cleavage.[52] On this point, it is important to note that the United States only became a fully multi-ethnic democracy after the 1965 Voting Rights Act.[53] The extension of democratic rights to African Americans followed a long and tortured process of democratization.[54] Given this historical and social context, illiberal democracy[55] probably has a mass constituency in the United States, as it does in Hungary, Poland, the Philippines, and elsewhere.

Americans who would respond favorably to a more racialized, populist form of politics may be an underserved constituency in U.S. politics. Political elites are the traditional bulwark of liberal democracy. Public opinion scholars have long found that support for liberal democratic principles is much stronger "among the highly educated and politically alert, and especially among public officials" than in the mass public.[56] With occasional exceptions, mainstream politicians in American politics have tended to steer clear of explicitly racial appeals. But the gap between regular voters and the educated elite on these dimensions can present opportunities for ruthless politicians, particularly in times of low trust in government.

Should politicians activate such cleavages, there is no guarantee that elite gatekeepers can stop them from winning nominations or taking control of a major party. Indeed, U.S. party leaders have less control over nominations than party leaders in most other democracies, where

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[48] Robert Huckfeldt and Carol Weitzel Kohfield, *Race and the Decline of Class in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 2.
[49] Pew Research Center, "The Parties on the Eve of the 2016 Election: Two Coalitions, Moving Further Apart," September 2016.
[50] Michael Tesler, *Post-Racial or Most-Racial: Race and Politics in the Obama Era* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 144-165
[51] Jennifer E. Manning, "Membership of the 115th Congress: A Profile," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R44762, March 13, 2017.
[52]Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1972).
[53] Robert Mickey, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Ahmad Way, "Is America Still Safe for Democracy?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2017.
[54] Robert Mickey, *Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America's Deep South* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); Desmond King, Robert C. Lieberman, Gretchen Ritter and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Democratization in America*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 3-27.
[55] Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (Nov.-Dec. 1997): 22-43.
[56] Robert S. Erickson and Kent L. Tedin, *American Public* Opinion, 6th edition (New York: Routledge), 164.

national party leaders usually wield at least a veto. As the Republican presidential nomination of Donald Trump clearly illustrates, U.S. parties cannot necessarily decide such things.[57]

The outlines of a less inclusive, more populist politics appear in more than embryonic form in the 2016 elections. Over the course of his campaign, Trump violated the norms of liberal democracy in numerous ways. When he launched his campaign in June 2015, he did so with a speech labeling Mexican immigrants "rapists" and criminals. He called for a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States."[58] He claimed that a judge of Mexican descent could not be fair in handling the Trump University case.[59] Repeatedly at campaign rallies, he expressed nostalgia for a time when extra-legal violence could be deployed against protestors.[60] In each of these controversies, Trump was denounced by mainstream opinion leaders and officeholders in the Republican party. However, it is very possible that his willingness to express "politically incorrect" views of this kind was key to Trump's ability to win the Republican nomination in the first place. Trump had kept himself in the limelight for years before the 2016 primaries by promoting the "birther" conspiracy that President Obama had not been born in the United States. By being willing to violate norms of these kinds, Trump was able to offer primary voters a product that other Republican elites refused to supply. Giving voice to such sentiments may have allowed him to forge a unique bond of trust and "authenticity" with the party base.

It is possible that the United States might come to exhibit a less liberal, inclusive form of democracy. It seems almost certain that Trump's example will point the way to other ambitious politicians seeking advancement in the future. On the other hand, Trump is also an exceptionally unpopular president. He does not command anything like the domestic support of Erdoğan, Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi or Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte. At this juncture, the American party system is by no means fully racialized, in that whites still make up majorities of both parties nationally. It is simply too early to say whether the illiberal politics of 2016 are a harbinger of the future. But with his truculent populism and willingness to exploit racial resentments, Trump was able to appeal to attitudes that public opinion scholars have long known were present in the American electorate but not courted by mainstream politicians.

Conclusion

Taking stock of the prospects for democratic backsliding in the United States, the more serious vulnerabilities center on liberal democratic norms, rather than on executive aggrandizement or election manipulation. Whatever its failings in other respects, the Madisonian system thwarts concentration of power. But populism—a mindset with deep roots in American public opinion—threatens the norms of multi-ethnic liberal democracy in the United States, as it does elsewhere.

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[57] Marty Cohen, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller, "Party Versus Faction in the Reformed Presidential Nominating System" *P.S.: Political Science and Politics* 49 (2016): 701-708.
[58] Jenna Johnson, "Trump Calls for 'Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the United States," *Washington Post*, December 7, 2015.
[59] Brent Kendall, "Trump Says Judge's Mexican Heritage Presents 'Absolute Conflict,'" *Wall Street Journal*, June 3, 2016.
[60] Ainara Tiefenthaler, "Trump's History of Encouraging Violence," Times Video, March 14, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000004269364/trump-and-violence.html.